[Alcuin]

Just a glance at the map indicates that Gondor was in a better logistical position because their supply lines were shorter. In a protracted campaign of attrition of the type you are proposing, I think Gondor would have had the decisive advantage…

However long the Morgul lines of supply, Minas Ithil had no lines of supply at all: that was its problem. The Morgul army could be resupplied and reinforced almost at leisure; but not so Minas Ithil: no loss it sustained could be replaced. I am not “proposing” that there was a “protracted campaign,” I am relying upon Tolkien’s multiple assertions that the city was besieged for a long period. The exercise is not to negate what he wrote, but to explain it, is it not?

I agree with you, Kuruharan, that the military posture of Gondor is unlikely to have deteriorated in any significant way between III 1975 when Arnor collapsed and III 2000 when the siege of Minas Ithil began. The problem was, I think, that the Dúnedain of Gondor were first unprepared for any attack at all, believing that having vanquished both the Wainriders and the Haradrim, they faced no risk of attack; and in the second place, they had no idea what tactical problems they faced in combating the Ringwraiths.

Eärnil lacked the insight and experience to deal with the Nazgûl, something the commanders of Arthedain possessed in spades; Arthedain lacked the means to defend itself from the assault of Angmar, and Gondor was slow to come to its aid, when timely assistance might have saved the struggling kingdom. In this way the words of Malbeth the Seer came true (RotK, “Appendix A”, “Gondor and the Heirs of Anárion”),

...a choice will come to the Dúnedain, and if they take the one that seems less hopeful, then your son will change his name and become king of a great realm. If not, then much sorrow and many lives of men shall pass, until the Dúnedain arise and are united again.

I think the import is that Arvedui and his captains among the Northern Dúnedain possessed the experience, skills and insight their kinsfolk in Gondor lacked to break the siege; but they were dead or scattered.

As for some of the unique problems conflict with the Ringwraiths might entail, consider these points as a beginning:

• The Ringwraiths could move invisibly through the lines to spy upon their opponents.
• The Ringwraiths could move invisibly through the lines to attack or assassinate their opponents.
• The Ringwraiths could terrify their opponents. Tolkien says, in fact, that this was their primary advantage, and that they had not other particular physical advantages, aside from invisibility.
• The Ringwraiths possessed Morgul-knives, a weapon apparently well-known to the Northern Dúnedain, well enough that Aragorn knew about them and how to deal with them 1,000 years later. The effect of these weapons must have been frightening and demoralizing to the soldiers of Gondor.

As for what you regard as the ineffectiveness of Witch-king in the North, I recall that Angmar had besieged and taken Fornost, apparently slaughtering the inhabitants when it fell, annihilating the greater part of the Northern Dúnedain. The Elves of Lindon were present at the battle on the plain between Lake Nenuial and the North Downs, including Círdan, who is named as the commander of the combined army of the Elves and Dúnedain. Círdan also helped Arthedain repel the Angmar army in III 1409. I think Elves were less susceptible to the fear exuded by the Nazgûl as well, perhaps, as their weapons. In any case, I believe Tolkien indicates that the reason the complete victory of the allies over Angmar was because the Witch-king erred in coming out into the plain to meet their attack rather than waiting for them to approach Fornost, which he held: it seems that he might have been more successful had he waited for them there.

If one is just wanting to grind it out, than a meeting of the front lines is all that is required. But I don’t think a Thermopylaesque battle in the pass is what would have happened anyway (a situation where I think the Gondorians would have won in the end anyway, just like the Persians did). I think it would have been more of a siege.

It was a siege! My reference to Thermopylae has to do with defending a narrow pass: an advantage accrues to a smaller force in command of a pass: the front lines are compressed, and a well-trained, well-prepared, well-led group can often fend off repeated attacks from a much larger force because it is impossible for the larger force to bring its numbers to bear.

You are in error about the Persian victory at Thermopylae. Xerxes never broke the Greek blockade of the pass despite repeated frontal assaults. The Greeks were betrayed by Ephialtes of Trachis, who is remembered as one of the great traitors of history. He led the Persian infantry by a “secret” way over the mountain to attack the Greeks from behind. In the case of Minas Ithil, the “secret way” was through Torech Ungol, but that was under control of the Nazgûl who first seized the Tower of Cirith Ungol by treachery, besides any difficulties the Dúnedain would have faced from Shelob.

You are correct about the word “fortification” to describe what the Morgul army probably did to secure their positions. I think you are overlooking the outcome of any fortifications, however: they would give the Morgul army the same tactical and strategic advantages over any counterattack by Gondor that Gondor’s fortifications enjoyed against attacks by Mordor or the Haradrim or the Easterlings. It was a strategic reversal of monumental proportions and a disastrous loss for Gondor.

I’m afraid that the words “take by surprise” followed by “two-year siege” used regarding the same event have a rather jarring effect in my brain.

I don’t understand your point. The initial attack was a surprise, and a two-year siege followed. Tolkien makes it perfectly clear that Gondor abandoned or severely undermanned all its fortresses along its border with Mordor, partly out of a lack of manpower, partly no doubt because they believed there was no one in Mordor that could launch such an attack, and particularly because they had just defeated the Haradrim and, as you point out, “the Wainriders been completely broken 56 years before.”

I don’t believe Gondor was “impotent” in III 2000-2002. They were surprised, indicating that they were unprepared: they let their guard down, literally. I believe they were unable to break the siege of Minas Ithil because of topography, the same advantage that made Minas Ithil a strategically important fortress; and because they were facing the Nazgûl for the first time themselves and lacked the insight and experience to deal with them.

Tolkien’s explanation makes perfectly good sense to me.

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Farael, I found your post after I finished posting.

I cannot imagine that “bandits” would interfere with the Nazgûl’s operations – not more than once, anyway: the consequences were too severe, and the folk of Mordor worshipped Sauron. Attacking a supply caravan intended for the Nazgûl should be tantamount to a religious taboo for them. Besides, it isn’t whether the Nazgûl had difficulty resupplying and reinforcing themselves, but that they could resupply and reinforce, while Minas Ithil could not. Nurn was at most ten days away, and it isn’t as if the Nazgûl launched their assault without considerable preparation.

There could never be very many troops on the front line for either side of a battle in the pass. Karen Wynn Fonstad’s map in Atlas of Middle-earth and Tolkien’s sketch in War of the Ring indicate that there was at least one severe turn in the road in the mouth of the pass, and possibly two: getting a large catapult to the front line, manning it, and preventing the Morgul force from launching an attack on it before it was ready must have presented some difficulties. Catapults in the real world were rarely dragged or wheeled into position, but generally assembled either from scratch or from pre-constructed machines disassembled and transported to where they were needed. It is not as if Eärnil’s engineers could do this without being observed, giving the Nazgûl an opportunity to respond; and since they could respond without being seen, I think that gave them a considerable advantage.

As for the force besieged in Minas Ithil, the text says that the population of the city had been devastated by plague and never recovered. We know that Gondor had already abandoned its posts along the border. I think we can safely assume that Minas Ithil had a very small garrison for its size and importance.

Any counterattacks launched from Minas Ithil, unless successful in breaking the siege, would leave the citadel in a weaker position. If the garrison were small to begin with, as it seems to have been, then launching a counterattack would be a risky proposition. They might have tried it in concert with an attack on the mouth of the pass, since they had excellent communication with the army of Gondor outside; but again, I think that Dúnedain of Gondor lacked the insight and experience to deal with the Nazgûl.