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Saurreg · 02-16-2005, 10:13 AM

Here's a little thought I have. I do hope Kuruharan and other knowlegeable military enthusiaists can expound or maybe even expostulate on it.

Strategic Comment

Cavalry of Rohan

It is in my view that despite being big men on big horses (that itself is subjective), the Rohirrim soldiers were light cavalry men on the lines of Khazar, Sarmatian and Scynthian light horsemen as well as the Sicilian cavalry during the Hellenistic era. The ways in which they were deployed as well as the weapons they used closely resembled the recorded doctrine of the three people as well as other riders from central asia and the Iranian plateau.

Heavy cavalry on the other hand had been used exclusively as a shock weapon on the battlefields to drive fear into the enemy through sheer momentum and size and hopefully generate a rout. Thessalian and later Macedonian heavy cavalry were antiquity's prime examples of lance mounted men trained to charge and overwhelm the enemy in a critical moment. The extreme example of the heavy cavalry would be the eastern cataphracts and their heavily armored successors. In any case heavy cavalry was the least flexible and most difficult branch of the mounted arm to command due to their impetuosity and low stamina.

Mongolian heavy cavalry was an exception but I do not think Tolkien based the Rohirrim on them. The battle of the Fords of Isen and the Rohirrim journey to Gondor were carried out at great speeds and the riders were battle-ready when they arrived at the battlefield - another characteristic trademark of the light horse men.

Force structure of Rohan and Its Inherent Deficiencies

If we are in agree that the generally the force structure of Rohan was based on the light cavalry with perhaps some exceptions such generals' bodyguard's etc, than the army of rohan would greatly resemble that of the Sarmatians and Scynthians.

The difference is that the two historical people were generally semi-nomadic. They lived within fixed regions but aside from burial mounts, they had no permanent settlements, as such their armies were centered on versatility and mobility as according to their lifestyle. Rohan on the other had permanent settlements that required defending (Settlement of westfold, Meduseld and Helmsdeep etc). Generally when there are fixed objectives to defend, an immoblie force is needed. Not immobile as in totally stationary but rather, a force centered on the ability to withstand impact without shifting rather than high mobility. Infantry is the most versatile branch of the armed forces and itself can be divided into heavy and light types.

Heavy infantry are classified as infantry that is able to withstand shock and deliver some shock of its own. Greek hoplites and roman legionnaires are good examples of heavy infantry as well as Swiss pikemen from medieval ages. In Tolkien's world the heavy infantry non-par excellence was the Gondorian infantry. Light infantry on the other hand were skirmishers, missile troops and lighter armored foot soldiers whose main feature is versatility and flexibility.

Of the two types, heavy infantry offers higher survivability on the open battlefield (the presence of other arms such as artillery and cavalry provide of course) whereas light infantry should not be deployed without other branches of the army out in the open but are more economical in fortifying settlement defences.

This brings us back to Rohan. Despite its achievements with the light cavalry arm, it is essential an unstable force devoid of an effective infantry. There were infantry militias of course, but they lack the staying power of well-trained heavy infantry and would be at best second rate light infantry. History has shown such outfits as totally ineffective on the battlefield and the weaklink of the army against a capable foe.

The most effective armies of antiquity from Philip's Macedonian war machine to Surenas' Parthian war host operated on the principles of combined arms. It was the job of the heavy infantry to hold while the cavalry pushed. The artillery had the vital task of effecting the above maneuvers with their awesome (hopefully) firepower. None of the three could perform well without the other. Without infantry, the enemy would flow with the push. Without cavalry, the enemy would simply pull and without effective artillery, hold and push may not occur.

The fact that the Rohirrim was lacking both infantry and artillery and possessed only light cavalry goes to show how deficient the army was. It was their fortune that Tolkien decided not pit them against an army with an Alexander or his immediate successors in his fable.

Campaign Comment

First battle of The Fords of Isen

(I shall be using Rumil's Excellent post and information for a stage by stage commentary. He has done such a fine job.)

We know Theodred mustered the troops of his own household and went forth to Isengard while Elfhelm remained for the continuing muster other available troops. This would leave Theodred with over 1400 light horsemen and over 800 militia light infantry of dubious quality for his "invasion force".

What was his primarily objective? Was it to destroy the army of isengard itself during its lax pax state of readiness? Or to lay siege and capture Isengard?"

We do not know except to speculate the the first objective was most probable and that it was Theodred's intention to preemptively assault Saruman and deal him a crippling blow. That it self is impossible since we know the great strength of the latter's army and the fact that the Rohirrim were lacking in infantry and artillery (the hold and push effect comes into play here). Even if possessing supreme skill and courage, the little force would simply dash itself to pieces in the initial charge.

Throughout the entire cause of the battle, the Rohirrim have displayed an incredible ineptitude in reconnaissance and information gathering. This was unlikely in light cavalry since scouting was one of their chief missions. It was either the Rohirrim cavalry like Gallic cavalry were of low quality and at best mediocre or to give Tolkien's prized horsemen a benefit of a doubt, Theodred knew his force was too small and hence arrayed his riders in close ranks, placing a higher premium on force security and battle-readiness over intelligence. If that was the case why did he still commence his mission? Either way, he had committed the ultimate fatal error of going into battle blind.

After scattering the mounted force of his enemy (most probably a scouting force), Theodred rode on in pursuit until he encountered enemy pikemen and ground fortifications in a narrow defile. The battlefield was then clearly an infantryman's battle. If the Rohirrim had a band of tough light infantry like Macedonian Hypasists on call, they could have been sent to clear the trenches and make way for heavy infantry. However Theodred had none of those. What he had was an outfit on unsuitable terrain against unsuitable defences and enemies. A defeat is expected.

When Theodred drew his forces back and decided to make a stand at the fords, he made the ultimate tactical blunder - committing unsuitable forces to unsuitable terrain fighting in an unsuitable manner. The Fords of Isen on either bank and on the island offered little protection for his light infantry militia of dubious quality. As commented before, I believe that only heavy infantry could hold open ground on their own indefinitely. Erkenbrand's militia were not heavy infantry and for them to hold a static line and recieve shock is tantamount to suicide. Theodred must have also ordered some cavaliers to dismount and fight as infantry. Ditto. As for the rest of the riders, they were positioned near to the static line at the east bank to act as missile troops most likely. This is a tactical error - the worth in cavalry is fundamentally maneuver and mobility. By placing them in such close vicinity as the static line, the riders have had their attributes greatly reduced.

It is in my opinion that Theodred should have traded space for time and mobility for shock. His main advantage over his enemy was mobility and he should have made full use of it. A withdrawal eastwards followed by a razed down policy could keep his enemy in check. Also when the time came the Rohirrim could adopt Sun Tzu's dictum of pinning down the enemy front with an ordinary force while outflanking with an extraordinary force. In that maneuver the center of gravity and objective of the maneuver would be the enemy's point of weakness, the one would would cause the total psychological collapse of the enemy - easily the Isen fords again.

02-16-2005, 10:13 AM	#144
Saurreg Shade of Carn Dûm Join Date: Oct 2002 Location: In self imposed exile... Posts: 473	Here's a little thought I have. I do hope Kuruharan and other knowlegeable military enthusiaists can expound or maybe even expostulate on it. Strategic Comment Cavalry of Rohan It is in my view that despite being big men on big horses (that itself is subjective), the Rohirrim soldiers were light cavalry men on the lines of Khazar, Sarmatian and Scynthian light horsemen as well as the Sicilian cavalry during the Hellenistic era. The ways in which they were deployed as well as the weapons they used closely resembled the recorded doctrine of the three people as well as other riders from central asia and the Iranian plateau. Heavy cavalry on the other hand had been used exclusively as a shock weapon on the battlefields to drive fear into the enemy through sheer momentum and size and hopefully generate a rout. Thessalian and later Macedonian heavy cavalry were antiquity's prime examples of lance mounted men trained to charge and overwhelm the enemy in a critical moment. The extreme example of the heavy cavalry would be the eastern cataphracts and their heavily armored successors. In any case heavy cavalry was the least flexible and most difficult branch of the mounted arm to command due to their impetuosity and low stamina. Mongolian heavy cavalry was an exception but I do not think Tolkien based the Rohirrim on them. The battle of the Fords of Isen and the Rohirrim journey to Gondor were carried out at great speeds and the riders were battle-ready when they arrived at the battlefield - another characteristic trademark of the light horse men. Force structure of Rohan and Its Inherent Deficiencies If we are in agree that the generally the force structure of Rohan was based on the light cavalry with perhaps some exceptions such generals' bodyguard's etc, than the army of rohan would greatly resemble that of the Sarmatians and Scynthians. The difference is that the two historical people were generally semi-nomadic. They lived within fixed regions but aside from burial mounts, they had no permanent settlements, as such their armies were centered on versatility and mobility as according to their lifestyle. Rohan on the other had permanent settlements that required defending (Settlement of westfold, Meduseld and Helmsdeep etc). Generally when there are fixed objectives to defend, an immoblie force is needed. Not immobile as in totally stationary but rather, a force centered on the ability to withstand impact without shifting rather than high mobility. Infantry is the most versatile branch of the armed forces and itself can be divided into heavy and light types. Heavy infantry are classified as infantry that is able to withstand shock and deliver some shock of its own. Greek hoplites and roman legionnaires are good examples of heavy infantry as well as Swiss pikemen from medieval ages. In Tolkien's world the heavy infantry non-par excellence was the Gondorian infantry. Light infantry on the other hand were skirmishers, missile troops and lighter armored foot soldiers whose main feature is versatility and flexibility. Of the two types, heavy infantry offers higher survivability on the open battlefield (the presence of other arms such as artillery and cavalry provide of course) whereas light infantry should not be deployed without other branches of the army out in the open but are more economical in fortifying settlement defences. This brings us back to Rohan. Despite its achievements with the light cavalry arm, it is essential an unstable force devoid of an effective infantry. There were infantry militias of course, but they lack the staying power of well-trained heavy infantry and would be at best second rate light infantry. History has shown such outfits as totally ineffective on the battlefield and the weaklink of the army against a capable foe. The most effective armies of antiquity from Philip's Macedonian war machine to Surenas' Parthian war host operated on the principles of combined arms. It was the job of the heavy infantry to hold while the cavalry pushed. The artillery had the vital task of effecting the above maneuvers with their awesome (hopefully) firepower. None of the three could perform well without the other. Without infantry, the enemy would flow with the push. Without cavalry, the enemy would simply pull and without effective artillery, hold and push may not occur. The fact that the Rohirrim was lacking both infantry and artillery and possessed only light cavalry goes to show how deficient the army was. It was their fortune that Tolkien decided not pit them against an army with an Alexander or his immediate successors in his fable. Campaign Comment First battle of The Fords of Isen (I shall be using Rumil's Excellent post and information for a stage by stage commentary. He has done such a fine job.) We know Theodred mustered the troops of his own household and went forth to Isengard while Elfhelm remained for the continuing muster other available troops. This would leave Theodred with over 1400 light horsemen and over 800 militia light infantry of dubious quality for his "invasion force". What was his primarily objective? Was it to destroy the army of isengard itself during its lax pax state of readiness? Or to lay siege and capture Isengard?" We do not know except to speculate the the first objective was most probable and that it was Theodred's intention to preemptively assault Saruman and deal him a crippling blow. That it self is impossible since we know the great strength of the latter's army and the fact that the Rohirrim were lacking in infantry and artillery (the hold and push effect comes into play here). Even if possessing supreme skill and courage, the little force would simply dash itself to pieces in the initial charge. Throughout the entire cause of the battle, the Rohirrim have displayed an incredible ineptitude in reconnaissance and information gathering. This was unlikely in light cavalry since scouting was one of their chief missions. It was either the Rohirrim cavalry like Gallic cavalry were of low quality and at best mediocre or to give Tolkien's prized horsemen a benefit of a doubt, Theodred knew his force was too small and hence arrayed his riders in close ranks, placing a higher premium on force security and battle-readiness over intelligence. If that was the case why did he still commence his mission? Either way, he had committed the ultimate fatal error of going into battle blind. After scattering the mounted force of his enemy (most probably a scouting force), Theodred rode on in pursuit until he encountered enemy pikemen and ground fortifications in a narrow defile. The battlefield was then clearly an infantryman's battle. If the Rohirrim had a band of tough light infantry like Macedonian Hypasists on call, they could have been sent to clear the trenches and make way for heavy infantry. However Theodred had none of those. What he had was an outfit on unsuitable terrain against unsuitable defences and enemies. A defeat is expected. When Theodred drew his forces back and decided to make a stand at the fords, he made the ultimate tactical blunder - committing unsuitable forces to unsuitable terrain fighting in an unsuitable manner. The Fords of Isen on either bank and on the island offered little protection for his light infantry militia of dubious quality. As commented before, I believe that only heavy infantry could hold open ground on their own indefinitely. Erkenbrand's militia were not heavy infantry and for them to hold a static line and recieve shock is tantamount to suicide. Theodred must have also ordered some cavaliers to dismount and fight as infantry. Ditto. As for the rest of the riders, they were positioned near to the static line at the east bank to act as missile troops most likely. This is a tactical error - the worth in cavalry is fundamentally maneuver and mobility. By placing them in such close vicinity as the static line, the riders have had their attributes greatly reduced. It is in my opinion that Theodred should have traded space for time and mobility for shock. His main advantage over his enemy was mobility and he should have made full use of it. A withdrawal eastwards followed by a razed down policy could keep his enemy in check. Also when the time came the Rohirrim could adopt Sun Tzu's dictum of pinning down the enemy front with an ordinary force while outflanking with an extraordinary force. In that maneuver the center of gravity and objective of the maneuver would be the enemy's point of weakness, the one would would cause the total psychological collapse of the enemy - easily the Isen fords again. __________________ "Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities. " ~Voltaire Last edited by Saurreg; 02-16-2005 at 10:16 AM.