'The Lord of the Rings and Philosophy'

[Kuruharan]

But it leaves us, I would argue, with a fuzzy view of evil.

Or it presents the view that evil is rather fuzzy because it is a distortion of the Good.

[Lyta_Underhill]

What LOTR never gives us is the dramatization of Saruman's fall. We are told over and over than he is the bad guy. And we see behaviours which are not estimable. But we are never shown how it was that he succumbed to this evil. If we weren't told he was bad from the outset, would we be able to recognize his turpitude?

An interesting point to punctuate a very interesting discussion! There are too many points to cover in my limited time, so I'll stick to only a few. In the matter of Saruman's fall, we would have only the observations of those who came into contact with him (i.e., the Istari), who never suspected the depth of his corruption until it was almost too late. Even Gandalf did not realize the mechanism of his fall until Pippin's fortuitous encounter with the palantir shed light on it for him (and for Pippin, I believe!). The Evil can only be sleuthed out and back-analyzed by the forces of Good, for that is the POV insisted upon by Professor Tolkien.

One aspect of this "fall" I would say is the giving in of the individual to desire, the desire for material or non-material gain. Whenever one possesses something, one can lose it. Thus fear enters in, and the possessor can never be 100% satisfied. He or she must act or think in order to keep what is gained. I think this is also illustrated in the initial concept utilized by Sauron in the making of the Rings. If you objectify power, make it into a material thing, you can make people want it and fight for it, thus invoking desire and then following with fear of loss. There is probably nobody alive who does not feel desire in some measure and manner, so the attraction would be pretty much universal. Perhaps this is also one aspect of the enigmatic nature of Tom Bombadil that causes the Ring to be "just a thing" with no attached significance or power over him.

Also, the assertion that the Ring gives power according to the measure of its bearer would seem to bear out the design of its acting upon the desires within the bearer's heart, these desires being commensurate with his inner focus or "measure."

I know all this sidesteps the issue of morality to an extent, but perhaps it poses a new question: can there be happiness if there is desire? Can desire be reconciled with a moral code, or can it be simply resisted and a moral life be adhered to with a secret longing? Is this part of the kernel of Frodo's dissatisfaction once he has been divested of the Ring? All this and more on the next episode of "One Philosophy to Rule Them All!" [img]smilies/wink.gif[/img] (Forgive my silliness...just can't help it sometimes!)

Cheers,
Lyta

[ October 25, 2003: Message edited by: Lyta_Underhill ]

[Lord of Angmar]

And without demanding from readers an active effort to discriminate who is good and who is evil. (Bethberry)

I agree that Tolkien is not ambiguous in his characterizations. However, there are some examples that differ. There are varying opinions on the morality of such characters as Feanor and his sons and Turin Turambar. And certainly he leaves us in suspense until the end of the Two Towers about whether Gollum will change or remain the same. However, he does usually provide a clear-cut view of character morality as he defines it.

[Mister Underhill]

Kant disputes the notion of a morality in which happiness is the highest ethical goal, but he also writes: “I class the principle of moral feeling under that of happiness, because every empirical interest promises to contribute to our well-being by the agreeableness that a thing affords, whether it be immediately and without a view to profit, or whether profit be regarded.”

Again, I’m a bit out of my depth here, but I don’t think Plato asserts a system in which personal happiness is the highest goal either. Happiness, fulfillment, inner peace, and so on are rather side effects of virtue, not its goals.

To argue that perfect immorality can equal perfect happiness has a rather Orwellian twang to it. If it is easier, more expedient, and more profitable to be immoral, and yet through an immoral lifestyle you can still be happy and fulfilled and at peace, isn’t it logical to live an immoral lifestyle? And isn’t the morality of LotR then so much deluded hogwash, not even admirable as an unattainable ideal because it espouses the opposite (sacrifice, humility, mercy) of what is ‘rational’?

I suppose I don’t require the absolute rational justification of morality that some of you require, so I am unable to provide it for you on your terms. I’m back to where I was before – better men than me have tried and failed. Do I need to define happiness and fulfillment? I can tell you what happiness isn’t – the (fleeting) rush of feelings of omnipotence and power that some serial killers report feeling when they humiliate and murder their victims. A fulfilling relationship does not include the probability that either party will betray the other at any time if an opportunity for personal gain or pleasure presents itself. Inner peace is not compatible with scheming, manipulation, and duplicity. Listen, I can’t rationally prove that love is worth anything, but I’m not waiting around for proof. Am I merely constructing tautologies for myself, and striving after untenable, unsound, even foolish ideals (and all too often falling short of the mark)? So be it. I’d rather aspire after high ideals than neatly argue myself out of any responsibility to live up to a high moral standard. Better to idolize the likes of Gandalf and Ghandi than Gordon Gecko (“Greed is good. Greed works.”). I would also submit that the most extreme acts of morality do not have their bases in logic and rationality, but in emotion. I can only hope that when I am in need of someone to do the right thing, they won’t stop to consider whether or not there’s a bulletproof rational reason for them to help me.

Bêthberry: I think that people sometimes get overly caught up in the principle of “show not tell”. Exposition has its place. Theorists and critics rant that artists should always show and never tell, while storytellers do what they have to do to get the story out.

Following on Lyta’s excellent post regarding Saruman, I don’t have much to add. Is it really a flaw of LotR that we don’t see each step in Saruman’s fall? I don’t think so. Sometimes, indeed most often, evil presents itself to us without any explanation of how it became that way – as Hitler suddenly appeared on the world stage in the thirties. Is it really important to know how and why he fell? I’m also disappointed to see you fall back on the old critical saw that Tolkien is morally simplistic. There are whole threads devoted to disputing that idea kicking around in the archives of the Downs. Need we pull out Boromir, Denethor, Gollum, yes, even Saruman and his refusal to accept redemption again? Most of Tolkien’s characters struggle with fear, doubt, and temptation to one degree or another. Some are redeemed (Boromir), some are not (Denethor, Gollum).

[ October 26, 2003: Message edited by: Mister Underhill ]

[Lyta_Underhill]

There are varying opinions on the morality of such characters as Feanor and his sons and Turin Turambar.

Good examples, Lord of Angmar! It brings to my mind yet another point in the endless series of debates about the rightness or wrongness of the Oath of Fëanor and the doggedness of his sons in carrying it out. Certainly Fëanor desired his Silmarils; so did just about everyone else! But the uppermost in his mind was the villainy of Morgoth in the slaying of his father Finwë. Which was uppermost? Would his Oath be more justified if it were a simple act of avenging the death of his father? Did the Silmarils muddy the water too much? Did the Sons of Fëanor pursue the Oath out of an actual desire for the Silmarils or out of respect for their father's wishes? The moral battle seems to be fought most closely in the heart of Maedhros and Maglor, who were upstanding citizens of Middle Earth, until it came to those pesky Silmarils, and there we have a clear illustration of the doomed and unrighteous nature judged upon their Oath: neither can bear to handle the treasure they spent their last energies upon. Here there seems to be a moral judgement laid upon them by the very fabric and nature of the world itself, a clear illustration that they had strayed from the good and moral path, for their hands were literally burned! Does the burned hand teach best? Indeed! But this does seem to argue that in Tolkien's world there is an adjudicated morality, at least with respect to the Elves, and the punishment for the Sons of Fëanor is indeed perfectly fitted into this framework.

While I was ponderously writing and thinking, Mister Underhill came out with a long post I had to stop and consider. I am not sure if you are accusing me of considering Tolkien's morality simplistic or to reducing Saruman's fall to a simple one to one incidence with the use of the palantir, but I do not believe such things can be reduced like that, and apologize if I gave that impression. I simply related that this was a clarifying point in the mind of Gandalf and he relates his deductions to Pippin during their flight to Minas Tirith and only then do certain pieces fall into place. Although, I wouldn't say that it is necessarily a bad thing to have a simplistic moral view. Saruman the White was much purer and simpler than Saruman of Many Colors. "I liked white better." I take Gandalf's admonition to Saruman, "He who breaks a thing to find out what it is has left the path of wisdom," to be an apt one and that the more one complicates an issue, the cloudier it can seem, when, in most cases, the path is "plain as a pikestaff," as Sam would put it.

I cannot blame you for seeking your best personal path without falling back on the need to rationalize it, Underhill. That is admirable and is also something I hold to be a failing of certain philosophies that hold too closely to logic (although I am less qualified to enumerate them than just about anyone, as I haven't read philosophical works since the early 1980's and my memory is like a sieve.)

Well, I can't think of anything else right now, but I am thoroughly enjoying this discussion! My thanks to all involved!

Cheers,
Lyta

[ October 25, 2003: Message edited by: Lyta_Underhill ]

[Mister Underhill]

Sorry Lyta -- the lack of clarity is my fault. I found your post on Saruman to be quite excellent. It was that rascal Bêthberry whom I accused of accusing Tolkien of moral simplicity. [img]smilies/wink.gif[/img]

[Lyta_Underhill]

Ah, many thanks, Mister Underhill! I must say, however, that Bethberry's post was the one that got me up to posting velocity, so perhaps she gets the laurels for "Mover and Shaker," all simplicity aside! [img]smilies/wink.gif[/img]

And in that vein, I must add more! I just can't help it! Quoting Bethberry again:

Likely this is a consequence of Tolkien's decision (I assume) to attempt to dramatize good rather than evil. But it leaves us, I would argue, with a fuzzy view of evil. A view which tends towards the relatively simple habit of naming things evil without really analyzing what is the perilous attraction of evil. And without demanding from readers an active effort to discriminate who is good and who is evil.

Certainly the POV is one-sided, but I'd say this view is probably coincident with the views of many of the foot soldiers who head off to fight the wars of one country against another, or in the name of religion, etc. I think the redeeming aspect in Tolkien's work is the individual internalization of good, rather than the external, idealistic, tacked-on view that seems to be the result of the propaganda inflicted in modern wars and in modern peacetime. The intrinsic good nature of the Hobbits illustrates this for me, but even this must be indoctrinated to an extent, and by experience, the views of each hobbit is tempered. At the beginning of the story, we see Frodo expressing his views that Gollum should have been killed outright and his distaste at Gandalf mentioning that there could have been any relationship between Gollum and the race of Hobbits. His views are provincial, but, as his name subtly implies (Frodo-wise by experience), he learns better. He, more than any, learns the virtue of not merely discerning the good from the evil, but also reacting to it in a way that is inherently good in itself, i.e., with mercy. So, far from simply trotting off to fight Evil with his trusty friends, Frodo becomes a case in point, a testament to the possibilities for good in mortal beings, not because he blindly defends the good without understanding evil, but because he does not stoop to the level of the evil of which he learns more than he ever wished.

Perhaps I hold these views because Frodo is one of the characters I internalize and identify with above most of the others in the book. Maybe I hold these views because, in my later years I have come to focus on questions such as this in daily life, whereas they were not in the forefront 12 years ago when I first read LOTR. Evolution in thought IMO is a good thing, and I am always willing to be convinced of the merit of an idea.

Cheers!
Lyta

[Keeper of Dol Guldur]

This is where college finally pays off. . .

Another interesting parallel is the use of the debate to find the truth-Socrates used his Elenchus to draw somebody into an argument and turn them from sure of themselves and their views to confusion and utmost skepticism. Only once you've opened your mind to the fact that you can be wrong, can you truly understand something. In that regard, the Council of Elrond went over the various arguments, then ultimately decided what must be done once the other arguments were proven to be invalid. Of course, this human factors of Boromir, and other influences which would be a bit sketchy later couldn't have been taken into account as far as the debate went.

[Diamond18]

Before I add my two cents I should say that most often philosophical discussions travel quite a few feet over my head, but I’ve made it through all these posts in one piece so I will try to state what I’m thinking as clearly as possible (and, just for Sharkû, I will see if I can pull everything back to Tolkien [img]smilies/tongue.gif[/img]). Apologies if I’m impossible to understand or say something really stupid. Onward:

I think that, by and large, the idea that morality is worthwhile because it makes us feel better misses the point of morality to begin with. As evidenced by this discussion, it is impossible to define what happiness means to other people, or rate what is fulfilling, if we are trying to determine it on a strictly personal level. I do not believe that “right” and “wrong” is something developed by human society. Even though in the movie Gandalf tells Frodo to listen to what his heart tells him (FotR EE just before they come to the gates of Moria), I do not believe Tolkien would ever have adhered to such a statement. The heart lies, people lie, society lies. The characters in Tolkien who do right do not do it because their heart tells them to.

Aiwendill writes:

It seems to me (and it seems natural to me) that the right thing to do is the right thing to do, regardless of how the doer feels about it and regardless of how it will make the doer feel.

…

An implicit question here is whether morality actually exists (that is, whether there is really some rational justification for ideas of right and wrong) or whether it is merely a human invention. I hold out some hope for the former, but the more I think about things the more I am inclined toward the latter. And in this case, it makes no sense to talk about something actually being right or wrong; we can only talk about things being called right and wrong by humans.

This conclusion, I think, indicates why it is important to first understand the basis for morality. If it is, indeed, merely a result of people learning how to co-exist, there is, in fact, no such thing as right and wrong. Because of all the arguments that can be made about ends justifying means, and all the arguments that can be made for relativism and subjectivism, anything which begins with people determining what is best can never reach an answer about the nature or existence of morality itself. This is why, if we are to make an argument for morality, we have to lay aside all the logic and reasoning stemming from its effect on humans, and look at morality as something that was, is, and always will be regardless of the humans who follow it (or not). In order for it to be worth following, it has to be bigger than us.

Since Tolkien was Catholic, a Christian denomination, I think there is reason here to bring up the Christian philosophy (which is most certainly not the same as Plato). The reason for the morality in Tolkien’s works all ultimately goes back to Eru—Morgoth and Sauron are evil because they defy/try to supplant Eru. That is the root of their evil, the reason they are the head bad guys. All the evil works they commit are undeniably evil because they go against Eru. And Eru has the right to be The One because he existed before anything else, and nothing else could even exist without him. Therefore, anyone besides Eru cannot create truth, because Eru is Truth. So the concept of personal truth (i.e. this is what’s right ‘for me’) is bunk. Rightness, morality, and truth come from Eru/God and no other source. Evil and immorality come from opposing The One, therefore evil and immorality are not even things in and of themselves, they are merely “the opposite” of good. Eru cannot be evil, because evil cannot create, only twist. (I read an excellent explanation of this in a book about Tolkien, I believe by Kocher. It purported that all the evil in Tolkien’s work begins with or leads to nothingness.)

I don’t believe that you can justify morality without acknowledging that it all stems from one thing, one being, one ultimate truth. Is this simplistic? Yes. If you take away “The One” (Eru in Tolkien’s works, and Jesus in Christianity) you are left with humans as the ultimate beings. So therefore, yes, morality would have to come from humanity if it exists at all. This would make human selfishness not only justifiable, but an actual virtue. Plato’s philosophy (and any other that discounts God as the ultimate reason) seems to be rooted in selfishness, the belief that right and wrong can be defined by how it comes back around to the doer.

Plato’s statement that people are moral because it makes us feel good, falls short simply because people are not moral. Morality does not come from human thought or human emotions or human rationale. I believe that yes, evil can and does make individual people feel “good”, and evil can be justified on the level of human thought, because of our finite and selfish nature. But this should mean nothing, because if what you consider right and wrong is determined by what makes you feel good or bad, you believe that you are the most important being in the universe. You might not think this in those words, but isn’t that what it boils down to? If what makes you feel good is the answer, even if doing good for others makes you feel good, you’re still viewing your own self as the end to the question. The One. Morgoth wanted to be the most important being in the universe. That’s what made him the bad guy. And in different ways, whenever a character in Tolkien’s work acted in a way that seemed to be the best for his/herself personally at that moment, bad things happened. This follows the Christian philosophy that the self should not and is not the reason behind morality.

Also, simply saying that even if evildoers don’t seem to suffer in this life, they’ll be punished in afterlife, fails to touch on why they’ll be punished and why it is right for them to be punished. Being good just to avoid punishment doesn’t amount to much if you don’t acknowledge why good is good.

Even though this is really long, note that I’m only trying to touch on the origin of morality. Actions and thoughts that are considered moral can only be so, if morality can first be defined separate from those things. Actions and thoughts are only the results. The way I see the root (and I know the non-Christians and the moderators here are going to hate this, but remember, Christianity was Tolkien’s philosophy!) is that morality starts with acknowledging that God is the only One who has any right to define morality because He is true Morality, the First and Last reason for being, for doing, for thinking and feeling. Even though Tolkien did not make LotR blatantly Christian, all the “morality” and “immorality” upheld in his works can be traced back to the issue of Eru’s sanctity.

[Sharkû]

Diamond, your post coincides beautifully with what I have been preparing, therefore I have little to add.
Most of what you said can be supported by Tolkien's views from Myths Transformed, HoME X, 5, from which all following quotes are, many from the Melkor-Morgoth-essay:

"Every finite creature must have some weakness: that is some inadequacy to deal with some situations. It is not sinful when not willed, and when the creature does his best (even if it is not what should be done) as he sees it - with the conscious intent of serving Eru."
For 'sinful' one could read 'immoral' here. Note that flawed actions are, however, sinful when the person does not have the conscious purpose of serving Eru.

"[T]he mere contemplating of the possibility of genuine repentance, if that did not come specially then as a direct grace from Eru, was at least one last flicker of his [Morgoth's] true primeval nature."
Repentance is 'divine'.

"[E]vil things appeared in Arda, which did not descend from any direct plan or vision of Melkor: they were not 'his children'; and therefore, since all evil hates, hated him [Morgoth] too."
All evil creatures and persons hate. Hate rules out happiness. Constantly immoral beings cannot be happy in Eä.

"Melkor had abandoned for ever all 'spiritual' ambitions, and existed almost solely as a desire to possess and dominate matter, and Arda in particular."
Ultimate evil coincides with ultimate un-happiness: a desire that can never be fulfilled.

Conscious rejection of Eru and his creation, to the extent of Melkor, but also on a smaller scale, would be a hatred that could never be satisified. In the end, everything is within Eru's design, after all.

Note, however, that not all immoral actions include rejection of Eru's will, certainly not consciously so. Nevertheless it is correct that they stem from that.

n.b. I actually don't think it is very necessary to apply Christian philosophy to Eä, simply because Tolkien never described a Christian Eä, but a monotheistic one, long before the (apparently eventual) coming of Christ to Middle-earth. Of course, that might just be paying too much attention to terminology.

[ October 26, 2003: Message edited by: Sharkû ]

[Mister Underhill]

Very interesting and articulate comments, Diamond. I have a few observations:

First, and with all the usual disclaimers that my Plato is rusty, I think you have misapprehended Plato’s – and possibly my – position. Plato indeed held that morality proceeded from “the gods”, which is the same as “from God” for our purposes here – that is, in Plato’s view, morality is not a human invention, nor is its ultimate aim individual happiness or the mere orderly conduct of society. If you believe that morality proceeds from ultimate truth, and that subversion of or opposition to that truth (immorality) leads to nothingness and evil, it follows that the more you are in accord with truth/God/the gods, the more contented, fulfilled, and at peace you will be, whereas the more you are in discord with that truth, the more you will be spiritually miserable. This, I think, is the thrust of Plato’s statement quoted from Esty’s book far above.

Second, if you believe in a benevolent God who created humans and who desires them to be in accord with His truth, then I think you must also admit that humans must come equipped with some means of discerning truth from falsehood, right from wrong. This must be even more true in Middle-earth, where there is no received law from Eru to guide human behavior. We call this conscience, of course, and in this sense, I think Tolkien would not have looked too sharply on the “listen to your heart” line (cf. Romans 2:14-15).

Sharkey, an outstanding text-based contribution, as always. I am all for exploring Tolkien’s Catholicism when it’s appropriate to do so, but I agree that there is little need to relate it directly here. In fact, I might add that since there are only the most obtuse references to Eru and no organized religion in sight in LotR, “conscious intent of serving Eru” might almost be read as “doing what one knows to be right”. Certainly we never see Frodo or Sam consciously puzzling over what Eru would have them do. They use their conscience as their guide. On the other hand, naturally, are characters such as Gandalf and Sauron, who have more insight into the concept of divine will and whether or not they are acting in accord with it.

[mark12_30]

Frodo and Sam do take Gandalf's opinion very, very seriously. If they know it or can guess it, they do their best to perform it. It's as if they understand that he Knows What Should Be, most of the time. They trust him a great deal.

If one considers Gandalf as either a prophet or an angelic power (Maia/Vala...) then perhaps the concept to obedience to the divine will is not so far removed as one might think. The common view of angels is, messengers from the Lord, whose job it is to communicate the commands of the Lord.

[Mister Underhill]

Good point, Helen, though I hasten to add that Gandalf is not a prophet in the true sense of that word, nor is he an angelic power in the sense that he serves as a herald for Eru, transmitting a direct message from him. He may be considered an angelic power in a way, of course, but a flawed and fallible one.

I'd also add that the average Middle-earther who did not have access to the tutelage of the very wise was left with little but his or her conscience to go on.

[ October 26, 2003: Message edited by: Mister Underhill ]

wow...comparing Plato to Tolkien may work... but according to himself Tolkien only meant for LOTR to be kind of the mythology of England, not philosophy... I think... [img]smilies/frown.gif[/img]

[Diamond18]

if you believe in a benevolent God who created humans and who desires them to be in accord with His truth, then I think you must also admit that humans must come equipped with some means of discerning truth from falsehood, right from wrong. This must be even more true in Middle-earth, where there is no received law from Eru to guide human behavior. We call this conscience, of course, and in this sense, I think Tolkien would not have looked too sharply on the “listen to your heart” line (cf. Romans 2:14-15).

To clarify: I wasn't discounting a God-given conscience as giving people an innate sense of good and evil, but the "listen to your heart" line is one I've heard thrown out in so many movies as the answer to any dilemma, as if right and wrong originate in the heart (rather than being "written on it"). In most contexts I don't think that "heart" and "conscience" are the same thing, as people often feel impulses to do wrong, based on the desires of a corrupted heart. So, in other words, our conscience ofttimes tells us not to do what our heart desires.

On Plato's philosophy: I admit that my knowledge of Plato's writings is quite slim, so I was mainly basing my comments pertaining to him off of the quote from Esty's post, which didn't include Plato's reasoning why immorality leads to ultimate misery. So I'm not surprised I misunderstood quite what he meant. Ah... well.... [img]smilies/smile.gif[/img]

[Aiwendil]

I've been away for a bit and I see that the discussion has moved on considerably from where I left off. Nonetheless, a few scattered remarks:

Arwen1858 wrote:

The definition given in the dictionary for fulfill that goes along with this discussion it 'to satisfy.' Are those people, who are living the immoral lives, satisfied? Do they have everything they desire? Are they completely happy with everything they have and everything they've done? I doubt that.

Substituting "satisfied" for "fulfilled" doesn't help. I can still ask precisely what you mean by it - and I think it will still come down either to being a simple state of mind or a tautology.

Lord of Angmar wrote:

I think, happily, that one can rationally justify what we would call a life of morality and virtue.

How? I ask in all seriousness. Kant tried to do this and failed, and I know of no one else who has done better. Note that what I mean by "rationally justify" is to provide a purely rational argument that people should behave morally.

Since I think we can all agree that nobody wants to be killed, and that we can all agree that it inherently makes us feel worse having been stolen from, lied to or cheated out of something, as I think has always been the case for civilized humanity, then we can sum up those things (murder, thievery, etc.) as being immoral.

But this does not provide any rational argument for why I - or anyone - should be moral. All it does is categorize actions as moral or immoral.

mark12_30 wrote:

I think Tolkien would heartily disagree, since his worldview was deeply and staunchly Catholic.

Undoubtedly. I was discussing the real world. But you are certainly right that, insofar as we analyze the morality of things in Middle-earth, we must accept Tolkien's views.

Mister Underhill wrote:

Kant disputes the notion of a morality in which happiness is the highest ethical goal, but he also writes: “I class the principle of moral feeling under that of happiness, because every empirical interest promises to contribute to our well-being by the agreeableness that a thing affords, whether it be immediately and without a view to profit, or whether profit be regarded.”

I'm at school so, alas (and ironically), I don't have any Kant with me. But I quite distinctly remember a passage in "Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals" where he says that one's inclination is irrelevant; one must perform moral actions out of duty rather than out of desire.

Again, I’m a bit out of my depth here, but I don’t think Plato asserts a system in which personal happiness is the highest goal either. Happiness, fulfillment, inner peace, and so on are rather side effects of virtue, not its goals.

Fair enough. I may have mischaracterized Plato's views. Nonetheless, Plato's theory does require that unhappiness inevitably accompanies immorality, so he still does draw a fundamental connection between the two concepts, of a kind completely different from any made by the Enlightenment thinkers.

To argue that perfect immorality can equal perfect happiness has a rather Orwellian twang to it. If it is easier, more expedient, and more profitable to be immoral, and yet through an immoral lifestyle you can still be happy and fulfilled and at peace, isn’t it logical to live an immoral lifestyle?

Alas, it seems so. Unless a purely rational justification for morality can be derived. But I will never choose to believe something simply because I prefer it or because I do not wish to face the consequences of some other view.

But note that, even in the case where morality is a fiction, a course of action can be rationally justified only with respect to certain ends. It might then be rational to be "immoral", with respect to the end of personal pleasure. But there could be nothing like moral force to such a rational argument. Someone who criticized LotR on these grounds could not say that the book was morally wrong, because in this world there is no such thing as moral wrong.

I suppose I don’t require the absolute rational justification of morality that some of you require, so I am unable to provide it for you on your terms.

The problem that I see with this is that without a rational justification, morality has no force. If I want to be immoral, you would not be able to give me a good reason not to be. And one's condemnation of an immoral person would be limited to a kind of "Tsk, tsk, that person will never be fulfilled."

There have been several other great posts here, but I don't have time to give them all the well-considered responses they deserve, so I'll stop at this.

[Arwen1858]

Mister Underhill wrote:

Second, if you believe in a benevolent God who created humans and who desires them to be in accord with His truth, then I think you must also admit that humans must come equipped with some means of discerning truth from falsehood, right from wrong. This must be even more true in Middle-earth, where there is no received law from Eru to guide human behavior. We call this conscience, of course, and in this sense, I think Tolkien would not have looked too sharply on the “listen to your heart” line (cf. Romans 2:14-15).

I'm glad you put a reference to that verse. I was wanting to quote it in my earlier post about the conscience, but I just couldn't remember where in the Bible it was at!

Diamond18 said:

To clarify: I wasn't discounting a God-given conscience as giving people an innate sense of good and evil, but the "listen to your heart" line is one I've heard thrown out in so many movies as the answer to any dilemma, as if right and wrong originate in the heart (rather than being "written on it"). In most contexts I don't think that "heart" and "conscience" are the same thing, as people often feel impulses to do wrong, based on the desires of a corrupted heart. So, in other words, our conscience ofttimes tells us not to do what our heart desires.

I think that a lot of times when someone says to follow your heart, they don't mean to follow your conscience. It seems to be tied more into emotion and what you want, rather than what is actually right. I guess it would depend on what context you mean it in.

Mister Underhill wrote:

Good point, Helen, though I hasten to add that Gandalf is not a prophet in the true sense of that word, nor is he an angelic power in the sense that he serves as a herald for Eru, transmitting a direct message from him. He may be considered an angelic power in a way, of course, but a flawed and fallible one.

I do see him as being like an angel in some ways. And in Christianity, some angels were flawed and fallible, as well. Satan himself was once an angel. But like Melkor or Sauron, his lust for power turned him bad.

Diamond18 said:

Before I add my two cents I should say that most often philosophical discussions travel quite a few feet over my head, but I’ve made it through all these posts in one piece so I will try to state what I’m thinking as clearly as possible

I've enjoyed your posts! It doesn't sound like you're in over your head. [img]smilies/smile.gif[/img]

I am a Christian, and do believe that God gave us a conscience, so we will know right from wrong. But by nature, often times we want to do something we know isn't right. That's what the conscience is for. To tell us what we're doing is wrong. And try to imagine a world without any morality at all. People would care mainly for themselves, would do what they wanted to do, regardless of how it might affect others. They would lie, steal, cheat, and kill if it would help them out. I don't think that morality is something that we humans have set up. I think it is ingrained in us. To bring this back around to Tolkien, here's an example. Why was Saruman bad? Sure, he had people killed, and yeah, he did follow Sauron, but was he really all that bad? I mean, he was just doing what he had to to achieve his goals and gain what he wanted. We consider him to be bad because we know the things he did to be wrong. Our sense of morality and our consciences tell us that it is wrong.
Well, I think I've gone on long enough!!
Arwen

[Mister Underhill]

Aiwendil, I think you’ve run up against the same barrier that Kant hit. If morality exists outside of human invention, then its source is unknowable, and therefore unprovable. Logic and science have no answers to the question, “Why?”

You’re coming from a viewpoint that will only accept purely rational justifications for morality and motives. I’m coming from the viewpoint that logic and science are useful tools and good as far as they go, but they are only tools that describe a fraction of reality, not reality itself, and are not the only routes to useful truth.

You may deride or dismiss motives or truths which do not proceed from anything other than pure logic, but I suggest to you that logic alone is not enough. Einstein once said, “Humanity has every reason to place the proclaimers of high moral standards and values above the discoverers of objective truth. What humanity owes to personalities like Buddha, Moses, and Jesus ranks for me higher than all the achievements of the enquiring and constructive mind.”

Have you ever read Michael Crichton’s non-fiction book, “Travels”? I recommend that you check out the book’s very last section, titled “Postscript: Skeptics at Cal Tech”, which contains a speech that Crichton delivered to a group of scientists. In it, Crichton does a good job (I think) of suggesting that science and rationality, while valuable, are not the be all and end all of human inquiry. It’s somewhat off-point of our discussion here, but is interesting reading nonetheless.

The reason I question you on the rationality of an immoral vs. a moral lifestyle is to see where you’re at, exactly, to find out whether you believe in the rationality of a generally immoral lifestyle and, if so, if you’re living according to that logic. Obviously, this is a somewhat rhetorical line of questioning, as you seem to feel at least some measure of distress or disappointment over where your conclusions are leading you. Would you say that you try to live a more or less moral lifestyle? Why or why not?

With regards to Kant, there is a distinction which appears to be missing here somewhere and which keeps leading to miscommunication, a fault which no doubt lies with yours truly. I am not arguing that moral actions are measured by the feelings of pleasure or pain that performing them evokes in the moment, nor am I arguing that Kant (or Plato) suggests anything of the kind. Moral actions frequently are difficult, even painful to perform because they involve some personal sacrifice. I’m speaking more of a deep inner happiness, an abiding fulfillment and deep contentment. Here I suppose we may approach some definition of happiness as being in accord with universal truth. Kant speaks of pure moral actions as ones that “elevate the soul”.

The point of all this Kant business is that I think Kant argues for moral imperatives as natural laws, performed not for the sake of some nebulous idea of what might produce personal happiness, but out of duty – “...principles dictated by reason, which must have their source wholly a priori and thence their commanding authority, expecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due respect for it, nothing from inclination, or else condemning the man to self-contempt and inward abhorrence.” My understanding of that is that refutation of those natural moral laws – or even observance of them for the wrong reasons – results in “self-contempt and inward abhorrence” – unhappiness. In this sense, I think Kant agrees with Plato insofar as he postulates that a moral life is superior to an immoral one for the very reason that immorality results ultimately in “a fundamental unhappiness”. While I may have specific interpretations of Kant wrong, I don’t think I’m far off in that regard. BTW, “Groundwork...” is available online (and is the source of the above quotations) at Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.

Diamond, thanks for the clarification. I’m curious, though – I decided to check the line in the movie, but couldn’t find the one you mention. Gandalf tells Frodo, “You must trust yourself. Trust your own strengths.” – a line which Tolkien may indeed have objected to.

[ October 27, 2003: Message edited by: Mister Underhill ]

[the phantom]

If morality exists outside of human invention, then its source is unknowable, and therefore unprovable. Logic and science have no answers to the question, “Why?”

I’m coming from the viewpoint that logic and science are useful tools and good as far as they go, but they are only tools that describe a fraction of reality, not reality itself, and are not the only routes to useful truth.

I think you have shown the importance (and perhaps necessity) of religious beliefs in forming a moral society.

Human reasoning alone does not appear to grasp the logic behind individual morality. It seems that a certain amount of faith is needed to justify a moral lifestyle, for behaving in such a way without clearly seeing an earthly incentive for the behavior does not seem logical unless one believes in a dimension of life that is not "earthly", but rather eternal or supernatural.

[Aiwendil]

If morality exists outside of human invention, then its source is unknowable, and therefore unprovable.

I don't think this is quite right. The implication is that if something exists outside of human invention then it is not epistemically accessible. But the laws of physics are surely knowable, even confirmable, and they exist outside of human invention (or are you a constructivist?).

Logic and science have no answers to the question, “Why?”

Only because the question "Why?" is so often imprecise. Logic and science have a great many answers to specific questions of the form "Why x, given y?" True, they don't answer meaningless questions or ill-formulated questions, but I can certainly live with that.

You may deride or dismiss motives or truths which do not proceed from anything other than pure logic, but I suggest to you that logic alone is not enough.

I will grant that logic alone is not enough. There are several troublesome problems in the foundations of rationality with the result (among others) that logic alone cannot tell us anything about the world. But we can be as strictly rational as possible in admitting further evidence. In other words, one cannot support an assumption simply by pointing out that logic is not sufficient to tell us about the world.

Would you say that you try to live a more or less moral lifestyle?

Yes.

Why or why not?

For two reasons. First, because I still suspect that there may be some purely rational derivation for morality. If there is, then it's good that I am being moral. If there isn't, it doesn't matter anyway.

Second, because it pleases me to be moral. But I do not claim this as a general truth for all people.

I am not arguing that moral actions are measured by the feelings of pleasure or pain that performing them evokes in the moment, nor am I arguing that Kant (or Plato) suggests anything of the kind. Moral actions frequently are difficult, even painful to perform because they involve some personal sacrifice. I’m speaking more of a deep inner happiness, an abiding fulfillment and deep contentment.

This is as I understood you. And again, I think that this fulfillment either reduces to a state of mind or to a set of requirements so strict that the equivelance of happiness and morality becomes tautological.

But perhaps a further clarification ought to be made. Do you claim that the morality or immorality of an action (or intention) arises in direct relation to this fulfillment? Or do you claim that morality simply is what it is, and that it just so happens that happiness is correlated with morality?

As I understand it, Plato and Aristotle claim the former. That is, they think that happiness and morality are, on the most basic level, tied to one another. In their view, it doesn't make sense to talk about morality without also talking about happiness.

In the latter view (which is how I think you are reading Kant), morality can be defined without reference to the happiness or fulfillment of the moral agent. But once it is so defined, a correlation can be drawn between happiness and morality. I'm not sure whether this is Kant's view or not - I had assumed it was not, but your reading is interesting.

I think that the latter view is probably approximately true. That is, I think there may be exceptions. The trouble with the former view is that it does not allow exceptions, for in that view it is meaningless to speak of a "happy immoral person".

Suppose there were a person who, through some neurological abnormality, found it really deeply satisfying to murder innocent people and was deeply troubled by the thought of committing an act of kindness.

Would you say that this person is moral? This is what I think the Platonic/Aristotelian view forces one to say. Would you say that the person is immoral and an exception to the general rule about morality corresponding to happiness? This is what I would say. Or would you say that you don't need to answer because this scenario is impossible? But why should it be impossible? Surely given sufficiently advanced neuroscience such a being could be constructed.

[Legolas]

What LOTR never gives us is the dramatization of Saruman's fall. We are told over and over than he is the bad guy. And we see behaviours which are not estimable. But we are never shown how it was that he succumbed to this evil. If we weren't told he was bad from the outset, would we be able to recognize his turpitude?

Likely this is a consequence of Tolkien's decision (I assume) to attempt to dramatize good rather than evil. But it leaves us, I would argue, with a fuzzy view of evil. A view which tends towards the relatively simple habit of naming things evil without really analyzing what is the perilous attraction of evil. And without demanding from readers an active effort to discriminate who is good and who is evil.

Evil is not so clearly or intentionally evil in its beginnings (often). It starts with mere disagreement with how things are being done; the "evil" guy thinks he would handle the situation better. It comes from good intentions. We do see where the problem with Saruman starts - with Curumo and Olorin being sent to Middle-earth. Who or what is evil is "fuzzy" because evil is a fuzzy concept. Saruman's problems begin (so far that we are aware) with Vara's noting that Gandalf is arriving last, but doesn't rank as such. The problem continues with Cirdan's giving Gandalf Narya, Galadriel and Elrond wanting Gandalf to head up the White Council, and so on. Further, Saruman was a Maia of Aule - Aule himself had trouble letting Eru be the Creator. It's not a coincidence that Sauron too was a Maia of Aule. This isn't given in The Lord of the Rings, but that's part of the limitations of the work's context. It's a journal written by a hobbit (or four) about the events in a very small slot of a world's history. It's a very limited point of view and time period when we're observing the 'angelic' immortal characters involved in a grander scale. Still, the jealousy/clashing of Saruman with Gandalf is presented with enough background information in the appendices, and we see what drove this further - the palantir, found with his occupancy of Orthanc nearly 100 years prior to his disagreement with Gandalf and the invasion of Dol Guldur.

[ October 27, 2003: Message edited by: Legolas ]

[The Saucepan Man]

Good golly! This subject has certainly generated an astounding number of thoughtful and well-argued posts. I cannot begin to do them all justice, largely because my knowledge of philosophy (which was never great in the first place) is now all but a distant memory. [img]smilies/rolleyes.gif[/img]

But I do feel it necessary to comment on some of the responses to my previous post (now buried somewhere on the first page). I should, however, preface my comments by making the point that what follows is my own personal view. I am not saying that I am right and everyone else is wrong. Nor am I seeking to deny the views (and faiths) of others. I am just seeking to explain my own thoughts on morality and, in so doing, explain (I hope) why I am able to derive personal enjoyment from Tolkien’s works and also inspiration from his depiction of morality.

First, I argued that Plato’s analysis could not, in my view, form the basis for a sound philosophy because I believe that those who act immorally can (unfortunately) sometimes achieve happiness and fulfilment. Mister Underhill challenged the examples that I gave on the basis that their circumstances would inevitably cause them unhappiness:

The fearfulness of the Machiavellian prince and his feeling that he is justified in using any means to maintain his position is not compatible with true happiness as I understand it. I would reiterate this argument with regards to other sorts of hypothetical situations put forward. Is the hypothetical sociopath who feels no moral qualms truly happy, fulfilled, and at peace? To what degree a person is able to justify or harden their heart against immoral actions isn’t really the question – the question is, what is the result of this sort of lifestyle? Is it better and more fulfilling than a lifestyle spent in the pursuit of virtue? I think not.

But Aiwendil made a good point when he said:

Well (and I suppose it would have been good to have asked this up front), what exactly do you mean by "happy" and "fulfilled"? If what you mean is simply what these words suggest at face value - that is, a simple state of mind - then you are on rather shaky ground in making claims about what other people secretly feel. If you mean something more complicated, something like living a certain type of life, or having certain types of relationships, or something along these lines, then you are constructing a tautology for yourself.

I do not think that, in seeking to assess whether a person is happy and fulfilled, we can necessarily impose on them our own views of what happiness and fulfilment are. Quite possibly, the serial killer’s fulfilment in killing outweighs for him the lack of ability to form personal relationships. Similarly, the wealth and power enjoyed by the mafia boss might well outweigh the lack of security inherent in his lifestyle. Of course, the majority would not find contentment in these ways because, in consequence of the moral norms that govern us, the guilt and remorse provoked by such actions would outweigh the benefits that they bring.

Kuruharan queried whether money or power can really bring contentment, given that there will always be an insatiable desire for more. I don’t disagree that these things can never bring complete fulfilment. But, then again, can a person whose goal is virtue ever achieve such a thing? To achieve a life of complete virtue is incredibly difficult, indeed impossible for most of not all.

Mister Underhill asked:

If it is easier, more expedient, and more profitable to be immoral, and yet through an immoral lifestyle you can still be happy and fulfilled and at peace, isn’t it logical to live an immoral lifestyle?

But that misunderstands my point. I am not saying that it is necessarily easier, more expedient or more profitable to act in an immoral manner. Because of those moral norms that I keep mentioning, the person that leads an immoral life is more likely to get caught and punished, less likely to be able to form normal relationships, and so more likely to find unhappiness and discontent as a result. Those that act immorally do so because a combination of circumstances (upbringing, economic situation, laxity of laws and/or their enforcement, psychological make-up etc) lead them to believe that society’s moral norms do not apply to them and/or that it is in their better interests to act immorally. I would like to think that, frequently, they are wrong on this. But I would maintain that there are those who are probably correct in their assessment and do, in fact, find happiness and contentment (on their terms) in their immoral behaviour. And, going back to my original point, this is why I do not accept Plato’s analysis as a sound foundation for a philosophy.

Of course you may say that the converse of this is pretty depressing, namely that the majority of us act (broadly) morally because we are afraid of the consequences if we do not. Well, I think that this is part of it. But, I also believe that the majority of us do find greater satisfaction in acting on a moral basis and that the contentment that this brings does outweigh the benefits that immoral actions might otherwise bring us. Which leads me nicely to my theory on the “evolution” of morality.

Diamond said:

… morality starts with acknowledging that God is the only One who has any right to define morality because He is true Morality, the First and Last reason for being, for doing, for thinking and feeling.

Similarly, the phantom said:

I think you have shown the importance (and perhaps necessity) of religious beliefs in forming a moral society … It seems that a certain amount of faith is needed to justify a moral lifestyle, for behaving in such a way without clearly seeing an earthly incentive for the behavior does not seem logical unless one believes in a dimension of life that is not "earthly", but rather eternal or supernatural.

From a purely personal point of view, I cannot agree with either of these statements. I do not believe that a person needs to have faith, in the sense of acknowledging the existence of God (or indeed any god) in order to live a moral life. Atheists are just as capable of behaving morally as believers (of any denomination). I cannot believe that morality comprises an external set of rules imposed upon us by a divine being, since I do not have a strong faith and cannot therefore accept that the way in which I live my life is governed by a God whose existence I cannot be sure of.

On the other hand, I do not believe that morality is a human construct, in the sense that people got together and decided how they should and should not behave. In this sense, I agree with Diamond that:

If it is, indeed, merely a result of people learning how to co-exist, there is, in fact, no such thing as right and wrong.

I believe that morality is a pattern of behaviour, a set of natural laws if you like, adherence to which brings benefit to the individual and to society as a whole. Mankind did not develop these laws as civilisation developed. Rather, civilisation developed on the basis of these laws because it was generally in its interests to do so. I believe in evolution, which involves creatures developing in a way that best suits the environment in which they find themselves. They do not choose to evolve in a certain way, they just do because it is in their best interests to do so. Of course, as Lord of Angmar pointed out, we would find many of the practices of past societies (and those of some societies today, possibly even are own) to be fairly barbaric. That is because society is continually developing, and as it develops, it strives to find greater compatibility with this moral code. And there are, and possibly always will be, “grey areas”. To what extent, for example, is it justified to kill in the common good (capital punishment, war etc)? Those who would regard themselves as moral persons will have differing views on such issues. Perhaps this moral code that we are striving for will one day give us the answer. I don’t know because we haven’t got there yet.

Mister Underhill said:

As for theories that have been outlined which suggest that morality is merely an evolved set of behaviors which are the most conducive to a smoothly running society, well, I find them cold and hollow, a diminishment of the great dignity and compassion of which the human spirit is capable to a trivial bit of sociological conditioning.

I disagree. Just because society has evolved on the basis of a code which it is in society’s interests to follow does not mean that the code is “cold and hollow”. It is precisely because these moral norms are such a good thing to strive for that we (or the majority of us, at least) adhere to them. And because we acknowledge the correctness of behaving in such a matter, we can admire the dignity and compassion shown by those who do so in such a comprehensive manner.

Within such a view, the great humanitarians and heroes of civilization are simply aberrations, people who for unknown reasons (maybe it was something off-kilter in their brain chemistry or their upbringing) exceed the sociological imperative that society run only more or less smoothly.

I see what you’re getting at. Why would someone lay down their life for another or follow a humanitarian cause for no personal (material) gain, when this might not be for the greater benefit of society as a whole? Indeed, why do some people care so for the rights of animals when this doesn’t even offer any benefit to our species? Well some such actions can be justified on the basis of my theory alone. I believe that an adult who gives their life in order to save a child is acting in the best interests of society, as is someone who alleviates the suffering of millions at great personal sacrifice. But there is something more. Because moral action benefits society, I believe that we have developed to feel happiness and contentment in consequence of behaving in such a manner (in the same way that we take pleasure in other acts which benefit our society). And so (some) people do act in such a manner even when there is not necessarily any personal or societal interest in them doing so, save for the contentment that they (and perhaps others) feel in consequence of their actions. I would not necessarily regard them as “aberrations”. They have simply taken adherence to the moral code to a different level.

Moral actions frequently are difficult, even painful to perform because they involve some personal sacrifice. I’m speaking more of a deep inner happiness, an abiding fulfillment and deep contentment.

Yes, I agree. It is fairly easy to live a broadly moral life. And this brings its own rewards to those that feel contentment in acting in such a manner. But to live a life of great virtue at great personal sacrifice is difficult and something that a great many are not able to achieve. Rather, their happiness comes from acting in a broadly moral manner, while maintaining the material benefits that they would otherwise have to sacrifice. It is, I suppose, a sliding scale. And further “down” the scale are those who are able to derive happiness from immoral action. Personally, I set great store by moral action and I do live my life in what I would consider to be a moral manner. But, at the same time, I acknowledge that I am no saint since I am not able (or perhaps I should say I do not feel the need) to make the personal sacrifices that that would entail. I am nowhere near the bottom of my sliding scale but by no means at the top of it.

And so, after wittering on at such length, it is time to apply my views to Tolkien’s works. And, of course, I agree with those who have made the point that moral action in Tolkien’s world derives from service to Iluvatar. The way I see it, that is because, being the “creator” of the world, he was able to impose upon it his own moral values. And being a religious man, he saw moral action as deriving from service to God. Because he viewed morality in terms of acting (or striving to act) in a way that best serves God’s purpose, morality in Middle-earth is necessarily portrayed in terms of acting (or striving to act) in a way that best serves the purposes of Eru.

Mister Underhill said:

I’m curious about the people who admire Tolkien’s work, but view its morality as untenable in the “real world”. Would you still admire Aragorn if he gained his throne through trickery or treachery? Would Gandalf be the same character if he had, say, used some deception to assassinate Saruman on the premise that the ends justify the means? Do you think that the pity of Frodo and Bilbo with regards to Gollum is fine for a novel, but not really applicable to real life?

Well, for a start, I do not regard the morality of Tolkien’s works as untenable in the real world (save to the extent that he portrays immoral behaviour as necessarily leading to unhappiness). While I do not hold the beliefs that Tolkien held, I do still share his moral outlook. As I hope I have explained above, I come at it from a different angle. I perceive the morality in the deeds of those such as Aragorn and Frodo in the fact that their actions are directed towards to the greater benefit of their society. Indeed you can’t really do any more to benefit society than to save it from dominion by one such as Sauron and the suffering that such dominion would bring. Even though my views on the source of morality differ from those of Tolkien, I can nevertheless appreciate the value in the actions of these characters and therefore admire, and derive inspiration, from the personal sacrifices that they made in doing so.

The point that you make about whether the ends might justify the means is an interesting one, Mister Underhill. This was touched on in Telchar’s thread about “Wyatt Earp”, where their was almost universal agreement that Gandalf’s “deception” of Sauron, by drawing his attention to the Black Gate, in order to afford Frodo and Sam a greater chance of reaching Mount Doom, was justified. The strategy was not immoral because it harmed only Sauron, the paradigm of immorality. Rather it was moral because it achieved immeasurable benefit for Middle-earth in the destruction of Sauron. On that thread, I posited in contrast a situation where Gandalf sacrificed Merry and Pippin in order to achieve Sauron’s defeat. That would be a situation where the means would certainly not justify the end. By perpetrating one terrible immoral act to defeat the immorality of Sauron, Gandalf would have been simply replacing one evil with another. A society where sacrifice of the good and the innocent was acceptable would be no better than a society ruled by Sauron, and so no benefit would have been achieved.

Tolkien’s treatment of the characters who fall in the grey areas is particularly interesting. There are many to choose from, but I have probably way overstayed my welcome on this post, so I will consider only Boromir. Here is a character who is basically moral. But he perceives that his own interests and those of his society (Gondor) are best served by using the Ring against Sauron. And so he perpetrates one immoral act (an assault upon Frodo, possibly with intent to murder) in order to achieve that. But he has failed to see what the wise have seen, namely that using the Ring against Sauron would be in the best interests of neither Gondor nor the wider society (Middle-earth), since it would only help to bring about Sauron’s victory. And so, although he is ultimately redeemed, he nevertheless has to answer for his actions.

And this brings me full circle to my original point, which is that no character in Tolkien’s works who behaves immorally in some way escapes the consequences of doing so. Even Pippin’s “theft” of the Palantir results in him undergoing a severe trauma when he looks in it and is confronted by Sauron. And Frodo has to answer for the consequences of ultimately succumbing to the Ring. And that, I believe, is where Tolkien’s works do depart from real life since, in my view, people are in real life sometimes able to escape the consequences of their immoral behaviour.

Whoops! Sorry about the inordinate length of this post. I’ll shut up now. [img]smilies/rolleyes.gif[/img] [img]smilies/wink.gif[/img]

[Lush]

This thread has rocked my world.

Lyta, a number of posts again, you asked: "Can there be happiness if there is desire? Can desire be reconciled with a moral code, or can it be simply resisted and a moral life be adhered to with a secret longing?"

I'd say a big "HELL NO" to both of those inquiries.

The nature of desire is destructive, as we've said before.

Happily (at least for me), it can be argued a person does not need desire in order to achieve anything.

With that notion in mind, I would like to put forth the idea that Bombadil is one of those creatures that can achieve anything without actually desiring the said achievement. This is a concept tied in closely to Eastern philosophy; something Tolkien didn't subscribe to, as far as we can tell, but I nevertheless find it curiously applicable here.

This philosophy holds not only that "no desire equals no suffering" but also the notion that "anything can be achieved without desire." As in: [good?] deeds are to be done for the sake of doing them.

Furthermore, the secret longing that you speak of, I believe, is the most destructive force within the individual and within society; because it manifests itself in a person's deeds, sometimes without a person even knowing it.

The power of longing lies not in its subject and the means of getting to or not getting to said subject, but in its mere existence.

This is why I find people that suppress their [immoral?] urges to be hilarious: because in my view they're not any better off as that cokehead that cannot resist doing another line or whatever one's poison of choice ultimately is.

At the end of the day, I find that in terms of morality or immorality, we are all equal before God. There can be none of that, "Well I'm not Hitler or Sauron or anything, so I must have a better shot at redemption" in my eyes.

Furthermore, I maintain that any theory that tries to encompass the notions of morality will be incomplete, whether it be Kant's or Aiwendil's (btw, my friend, the laws of physics are not as cut and dry as you make them out to be, there is lots of stuff going on in that realm that we may never understand) or Tolkien's, or whatever.

I like to take this whole morality business one day and one deed at a time; like Tolkien's Sam, I believe. I
Which is why I am ultimately satisfied with the "fuzzy" (but are they warm too? [img]smilies/wink.gif[/img] ) notions of immorality that Tolkien puts forth in LotR.

Whether consiously or not, Tolkien makes it pretty clear that he does not have all the answers.

Something about that makes the LotR ring truer for me than Plato's ponderings.

Oh, and Diamond: Don't give up on the notion of a human "heart," because of some cheesy lines in some cheesy movies.

The truth is, each human heart is corrupted somehow. That doesn't mean that the heart's leanings won't surprise you every once in a while.

And furthermore, my priest tells me that the divine cannot be reached through the pure workings of our conscience. It's gotta be a combined effort (remember Frodo at Weathertop? How he knew and did not know what he was doing or what force was speaking through him? Eh? Eh?).

[the phantom]

Saucepan Man wrote:

Atheists are just as capable of behaving morally as believers

They can behave morally, but my question is why? Why would an atheist behave morally?

I've seen arguments that say it's in the best interest of society for everyone to behave morally, but I'm not talking about society as a whole, I'm talking about the individual. It's often in the individual's best interest to behave immorally, so why doesn't he?

Is it fear of punishment? If so, then he's not really moral at heart.

Or do you think they act moral for the feeling of contentment you spoke of? But that doesn't make sense either since you said yourself that immoral people can "achieve happiness and fulfillment".

If both moral and immoral people can be happy in their own way, why choose one over the other? Especially, why choose the option that doesn't put your own wants and needs first?

In Tolkien's books there were moral characters that had their share of suffering (Beren, Finrod, Beleg) and there were immoral characters that had fame, power, wealth, and found enjoyment in their evil ways up until their death (Glaurung, Gothmog, Smaug, Witch King). If there was no eternal/supernatural dimension to Middle-Earth, I'd say that the bad guys were smarter.

Again, why pick a moral lifestyle over an immoral one?

What is the rational?

There doesn't appear to be any good reason, not one that I've seen yet, anyway. I personally believe that morality is beyond the simple wisdom and cold rational of man (and was not invented by man either). There has to be a reason for morality beyond this earth. If not, and this flesh and earth is all that there is to life, why not just grab everything you can for yourself and live a happy, immoral life? That would make the most sense.

[Aiwendil]

Lush wrote:

This is why I find people that suppress their [immoral?] urges to be hilarious: because in my view they're not any better off as that cokehead that cannot resist doing another line or whatever one's poison of choice ultimately is.

I don't understand. What would you have them do, give in to their immoral urges?

btw, my friend, the laws of physics are not as cut and dry as you make them out to be, there is lots of stuff going on in that realm that we may never understand

Did I say that they were cut and dry? I said that they are knowable and possibly confirmable. I suppose I ought to have prefaced "knowable" with "possibly" as well. There's still a host of problems that get in the way (the justification of logic, the acceptance of sense-data, the problem of confirmation, etc.). But at the very least, putting aside somewhat radical skeptical claims, we do at least know a great many things about the laws of physics.

Or were you referring to foundational problems in quantum mechanics? These are problems of a very different sort; they are primarily scientific rather than philosophical.

There's a whole very interesting and very lengthy discussion we could get into on either of these topics, but then I guess that's not exactly the purpose of this thread.

[Lyta_Underhill]

But the laws of physics are surely knowable, even confirmable, and they exist outside of human invention (or are you a constructivist?).

I'm not sure what a constructivist is, but certainly laws of physics are knowable, I would say. But I would also say that these same laws are human constructs derived to explain a universe that always manages to stay several steps ahead of the theorists, just as the tiny bugs of the universe seem to stay several steps ahead of the latest antimicrobial drugs. Somehow, it seems, the more we push, the further the answers slip beyond our searching minds, but it does keep us reaching, doesn't it? This is neither here nor there, I suppose. Lush, I don't know if you read the same pop physics books I do, but I know what you mean; the explanation of newer physics concepts to the layman is beginning to sound more and more like a spiritual exercise than a mathematical one.

There are several troublesome problems in the foundations of rationality with the result (among others) that logic alone cannot tell us anything about the world. But we can be as strictly rational as possible in admitting further evidence. In other words, one cannot support an assumption simply by pointing out that logic is not sufficient to tell us about the world.

Perhaps, Aiwendil, you have hit on one of the inevitable problems with defining what is, in effect a different question with different answers for those who consider it. It is impossible to reduce a concept to its basic motivations when the concept is not sufficiently defined in the first place.

When one equates happiness and adherence to a moral code, it is often in the context of what satisfies that person, and this is then equated to happiness. The moral life gives that person satisfaction. Most people believe they will be satisfied when a certain desire is met, which is a dangerous thing to assume, since desire appears addictive and ultimately never satisfiable. What most people do is adhere to a moral code, while maintaining what I referred to earlier as the "secret longing." I agree with Lush that it is amusing to watch someone who is obviously desirous of something but who denies desiring it. Certainly one cannot live a moral life if one begins by lying to oneself, even before lying to the wife and kids. [img]smilies/wink.gif[/img]

OK, where am I going with this? Well, I intend to take it back to Tolkien, specifically Frodo. I remember his vision on Amon Hen, when he wears the Ring, is where Frodo, I believe shows the fruit of his "moral lessons" from Gandalf. He is not simply taking Gandalf's exhortation to take off the Ring as a command, but he is seeing the entire situation across Middle Earth, all the armies laid out before him. He is balanced between Gandalf and the Eye, and for an instant, he makes his own choice, completely independent of both influences. He has become a node in himself, capable of his own considered actions in a very weighty matter indeed.

When he finally takes off the Ring, he does so of his own free will, and his path is absolutely clear to him, and he makes the proper choice in the proper way. Perhaps this is the "moral" choice, perhaps it is the most rational. Whatever its character, it is clear that Frodo has put aside fear and self-consideration for the larger cause. One could say he acted rationally, or one could say he acted morally, intending to save the rest of the Fellowship from a harsh fate by isolating himself with the Ring and taking the choice away from his companions. He certainly does Aragorn a service here.

Another aspect of this "morality" question as applied to Frodo would be his final outcome. Tolkien has as much as said that, with the Ring destroyed, Frodo is left with an emptiness, an eternal longing, for the lost Ring. Thus, although his selfless actions in getting the Ring to Mt. Doom are "moral," i.e., without desire, his consideration of Smeagol being driven by pity, his existence ruled by the small decisions he makes to get one step closer to his goal without sacrificing his "moral" code. In the end, he is broken down completely, reduced to the sum of his deeds, the moral and good deeds on one side, and his insatiable desire for the Ring, now unrecoverable, on the other. In the end, that desire and also the knowledge that he failed at the ultimate test eat away at him and somehow it seems he cannot live with the fact that he failed the unpassable test.

Perhaps this very outcome illustrates the ultimate limits of "morality," and shows that no one is perfectly moral, because everyone is flawed. In a way, it seems to point to the perfectly moral life as a goal that may never be reached, thus it is a path, a way of life, an act of Zen, etc., and thus it cannot be satisfactorily pinned down by rational or any other means.

Boy, I hope all that made sense, because it took forever to write, and its way too late to proofread...forgive me if there are muddy passages!

Cheers,
Lyta [img]smilies/smile.gif[/img]

[The Saucepan Man]

I don't know how I have the nerve to appear again so soon on thias thread after boring everyone silly with my earlier ramblings. But, just to answer the phantom's question, as briefly as I can:

... why pick a moral lifestyle over an immoral one?

Because:

• the majority of people (albeit to varying degrees) derive contentment from adhering to those moral norms and guilt and remorse from immoral action;
• only a minority (those towards the bottom of my sliding scale) are able to derive contentment from immoral action; and
• it is in any event inherently less likely that an individual will be able to derive happiness from immoral action (the risk of being caught, inability to form relationships, limitation of personal freedom etc).

Why do the majority of us derive contentment from moral action? Because that is how we have developed. I see it as a combination of nature and nurture. It is instinctive, but at the same time it is reinforced by our parents, our teachers, our church etc. Personally, I attribute my own moral viewpoint to the strong moral values that my parents instilled in me as I was growing up. I would, however, strongly disagree with them on some moral issues because I have since been exposed to wider influences and formed my own, sometimes different, views.

Lyta, I like your characterisation of Frodo's failure at Sammath Naur. It was, I suppose, a failing to succumb to temptation in the way that he did. Since the Ring was evil, it was an immoral act for him to try to claim it as his own. As you say, however, it was an unpassable test. Bombadil apart, no one could have resisted the lure of the Ring in that final moment. Perhaps this does represent a moral failing inherent in all peoples of Middle-earth (with the exception of Tom?. It seems to me harsh that a character who has displayed such moral fortitude in getting to that point should have to suffer the consequences of this one inevitable moment of immorality ever after. But, as I said, no one seems to escape the consequences of immoral action in Tolkien's world.

[Eurytus]

Lyta, I like your characterisation of Frodo's failure at Sammath Naur. It was, I suppose, a failing to succumb to temptation in the way that he did. Since the Ring was evil, it was an immoral act for him to try to claim it as his own. As you say, however, it was an unpassable test. Bombadil apart, no one could have resisted the lure of the Ring in that final moment. Perhaps this does represent a moral failing inherent in all peoples of Middle-earth (with the exception of Tom?. It seems to me harsh that a character who has displayed such moral fortitude in getting to that point should have to suffer the consequences of this one inevitable moment of immorality ever after. But, as I said, no one seems to escape the consequences of immoral action in Tolkien's world.

When I first read the LOTR I thought that Frodo had, in the end, failed in his quest. It was only later that I realised that in reality he had not really failed in his quest at all. The burden laid on him was to take the ring to Mount Doom, and to go as far along this road as he was able. This he did.

I later read a letter of Tolkien’s that expanded on this. Tolkien states that Frodo’s only duty was to take the ring as far as he was able and that, on Mount Doom where the Ring’s power was strongest, it would have been beyond anyone’s ability to destroy it. In short, the Wise had never expected Frodo to be able to destroy the ring. Tolkien speculates that Frodo’s triumph was both in getting to Mount Doom and in his application of pity towards Gollum that resulted in the events that followed. So in truth Frodo did in fact triumph. Though he may not have been able to see that fact.

Incidentally, in the same letter Tolkien makes some very interesting points about what would have happened had Gollum not fallen into the crack of doom, and what would have happened had Frodo not been attacked by Gollum.

I can recommend the Letters of JRR Tolkien to anyone. There is some great stuff in there.

[mark12_30]

Lyta wrote:

...he cannot live with the fact that he failed the unpassable test.

Can I quote you?

[ October 28, 2003: Message edited by: mark12_30 ]

[Eurytus]

If that quotation is in reference to my post then I can assure you that it in no way contradicts anything I have stated in my previous post.

The fact that Frodo feels he failed does not change the actual true nature of his success or indeed Tolkien's own view of it.

[mark12_30]

Eurytus, not at all. I do not disagree with your post (that letter is one of my favorites and runs the risk of getting dog-eared.) Lyta's statement is simply a brilliantly succinct expression of Frodo's inner turmoil, clarifying why he chose to sail west.

Lyta's statement would make a great sig. (dibs!) Lyta...? I promise to reference you.
[img]smilies/tongue.gif[/img]

[Eurytus]

Cool, no problem.

Just checking.... [img]smilies/wink.gif[/img]

[Lyta_Underhill]

Lyta's statement would make a great sig. (dibs!) Lyta...? I promise to reference you.

Feel free, mark12_30! I was so busy working this one out last night (late!) that I hadn't realized I put quotable material in there! Even if you didn't ask, I would probably just make little jabs in fun to the fact that it was my phrase. I never begrudge it though! Otherwise I would have jumped all over Miss Finwe for using my "Exploding Elf" description of Fëanor! (*jab* *jab*!) [img]smilies/wink.gif[/img]

I can, however, only claim a pale reflection in my post of the immortal "Frodo's Sacrifice" thread to which I never managed to contribute and which has the distinction of being the one thread which moved me to real tears! And yes, I know what you mean about that particular Letter of Tolkien's getting dog-eared!

Cheers,
Lyta

[Kuruharan]

Saucepan

But, then again, can a person whose goal is virtue ever achieve such a thing? To achieve a life of complete virtue is incredibly difficult, indeed impossible for most of not all.

No. Complete virtue is not possible. However, virtue is more worth striving for because it is beneficial to more than just your own selfish self. This is a point that Plato makes a few times. I think that in this thread this idea has not been given sufficient attention. Plato was not primarily concerned with individual happiness. In The Republic he tries to construct a just (moral) society. Individual satisfaction would derive from society as a whole.

For the moment, we are constructing, as we believe, the state which will be happy as a whole, not trying to secure the well-being of a select few...

[We were] molding our commonwealth with a view to the greatest happiness, not of one section of it, but of the whole.

Part of morality is to raise one from the muck of total self-absorption. This is part of the failure of an immoral lifestyle (and I would personally say it is not the most important part, but I’m not going to get into that right now.)

The problem is that if morality is looked at from a purely humanistic perspective there is no reason to place any particular value on other human beings. (Rather ironic, that.)

To cite an extreme example: A person is hanging over the edge of a cliff. Another person happens to be going by and sees the other unfortunate. Assuming that there is no possibility of assistance arriving in time (the victim’s arms being on the point of giving out) why should the one person risk their life to save the other? If one tries to help they may save the other but die themselves. They might also both fall to their deaths (probably the most likely outcome). And, lastly, you might save them. However, there is no reason to assume that the other individual is more beneficial to society than yourself. Assuming that this person falls and dies (human reproduction being what it is) another person of approximately equivalent moral value will be born in the next few seconds after this death, so there is really no reason for you to exert yourself (your own possible death is probably not going to be beneficial to you). Nobody will know that you refused to help, you can easily claim that you reached him too late (or disavow knowledge of this entirely). Why should you help? (Also assuming that this is somebody who is unknown to you, although if it were somebody you knew then you would be helping them because of emotional attachment and that is not rational either.)

I will let you answer before I attempt to give any of my own interpretation.

I guess that I am also trying to say that I feel that you did not really address the question that the phantom asked above. You seemed, at least to me (and I may have misunderstood you), to dodge the issue. Although you also had the stated intention of being brief and might not have had time to express yourself as fully as you wished.

[mark12_30]

Thanks, Lyta! Yes, "Frodo's Sacrifice" was one of the all-time great threads. (C7A rules!) It was that thread that *finally * reconciled me with his decision to sail west... which grieved me ever since my first reading at age 12, thirty years ago.

I hope he was happy and healed there. I can't imagine that he wasn't. "A purgatory and a reward", Tolkien called it; very Catholic. Although, considering his "Leaf By Niggle", Tolkien's view of purgatory was not the norm. I have to believe he meant Purgatory" in the sense of purification, and not of suffering-- Frodo had suffered enough!!! (I'm tempted to follow that with an entire paragraph of exclaimation points...)

His generosity and self-sacrifice for the good of the Shire and Middle Earth answers many questions about "morality". I heartily agree that the definition of morality must extend beyond the individual good, beyond the humanistic view.

[Lush]

This is why I find people that suppress their [immoral?] urges to be hilarious: because in my view they're not any better off as that cokehead that cannot resist doing another line or whatever one's poison of choice ultimately is.

I don't understand. What would you have them do, give in to their immoral urges?

Uh, No.

Perhaps I could have done a better job of phrasing my statement.

What I meant is that I find it hilarious when people look down upon others for doing stuff one might consider immoral (coke, cute little freshmen, whatever floats your boat) when they often experience the very same urges.

It's like we sit around today and judge Nazi Germany, without stopping to wonder how we have behaved had we lived back in that day and in that state.

It's like saying that Sam is better than Frodo, for doing, or not doing, what he did.

There are too many variables floating around to ever be fully sure of how you or someone else would have behaved given the same set of circumstances to deal with.

Ultimately, I am very thankful that we are able to make a few of the right choices every once in a while, as in: don't do that line, or don't grab at that Ring, but I don't think it's up to humans to define morality as a complete concept.

I'm saying that nobody is really moral and nobody really knows what morality is, we can only gather hints of the true nature of it all, for the rest of our lives.

Of course, that don't bother me none, because of my religious beliefs. I don't pretend that it's easy for other people to accept such a notion.

And as for physics: I've got a few friends over at the Duke Physics Dept., and we'll get together some nights and talk, and they will say to me that there are moments when they have no idea what on earth it is that they are studying and ultimately it does seem as if physics and its purpose will never be fully explained either.

Something about that makes me think that spirituality and science should go hand in hand, but the relationships are too high falutin' for me to even begin to define.

[Eurytus]

It's like we sit around today and judge Nazi Germany, without stopping to wonder how we have behaved had we lived back in that day and in that state.

I think that gassing people to death and burying them in mass graves or burning their remains is something that is not too hard to judge to be honest.
Whether we as individuals might have felt coerced to participate in such acts had we lived in that time, or whether we might have been caught up in the fervour that surrounded the propoganda that supported such a regime is somewhat irrelevant.

Can we make a judgement call from our current, detached postion as to whether such behaviour is right or wrong. I think we clearly can.

[mark12_30]

I think we need to re-examine Lush's statement. To me, her key phrases are "look down on" and "better than". These phrases are used when comparing people-- NOT actions. Reading her statement, she is not deniying the existance of right and wrong; she is saying that we all struggle with it, and when someone fails in their struggle, we have no right to say that we would have done better in their situation, or that we are better than they are. (This is one of the foundations for true humility, by the way.)

There is a vast difference between judging an action vice judging a person. Any person with a reasonable sense of morality (okay, I am going in circles here, but bear with me) can judge an action. But only an omniscient and perfectly just creature (i.e. God) can truly and justly judge a person, including that person's motives and choices.

Men judge actions and by them infer motives and attitudes. God (especially Tolkien's Catholic view of God) judges attitudes and motives, and THEN judges actions.

Taking this view to Middle Earth:

It was wrong of Frodo to claim the Ring (Yes, we all know that and we all wish that somehow he had been able to resist.) But is Frodo therefore a useless damnable traitor because he claimed the Ring? We may not judge that since we can't read his mind. We can only judge his actions and ***what we know*** of his intentions and desires, and if we do that we should come out in his favor.

Re the Nazi Germany example:

It was wrong to commit genocide (yes, we all know that and yes we all wish that more Germans had resisted the process.) But the average German citizen was not performing executions; he was trying to raise his kids, earn a living, etc, and the fact that people were disappearing at midnight may or may not have been under his control, although it probably did not escape his notice. Should he have done something? Did he know enough and was he able and brave enough to do anything? We all agree that it would have been much better if he had done something to prevent the genocide. But can we judge the fact that he didn't and call him a damnable traitor and a worthless, useless human being?

Maybe, but I think not. How omniscient are you, and how much do you know about his motives, his understanding of the situation, and his involvement in it?

I think this is Lush's point. The Lush I know is most certainly not in favor of genocide, nor implying that the act of genocide is un-judgeable. But I think she does mean, "Judge not that ye be not judged" and "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us." If we had been the average German on the street, would we have behaved differently? We may hope so, but without being there and going through it how can we make that claim?

So-- if you were Frodo, standing on Mount Doom, after having owned the Ring for seventeen years and carried it for thousands of miles, would you have claimed it? Or not? How do you know? And do you dare say you're better than he is because of your claims?

Lush, if I diverged from your intent there, please clarify (I'm not omnicient, after all...) [img]smilies/wink.gif[/img]

[ October 28, 2003: Message edited by: mark12_30 ]

[The Saucepan Man]

Kuruharan

However, virtue is more worth striving for because it is beneficial to more than just your own selfish self.

Well, a capitalist would say that the aggregation of wealth is to the benefit of society, since the wealth trickles down to the benefit of all. [img]smilies/wink.gif[/img]

But, to be serious, I don't disagree with you. I agree that it is a worthy aim to strive for virtue (virtuosity?), and that is why I can find inspiration in works such as LotR.

And this accords with my theory since, as is implicit in your statement, virtuous behaviour is generally beneficial to society as a whole, rather than just the individual, and therefore worthy of our aspirations.

Of course, when I say "my theory", I am really just making it up as I go along. As I said earlier, I find it difficult to accept that morality is imposed upon me by a being whose existence I doubt. But at the same time, I firmly believe that morality is not a human construct. Which leaves me with little choice but to believe that it is a pattern of behaviour which forms the basis for the development of human society because it is generally in society's interests (and the interests of the individuals within it) to follow this pattern. The rest of it just follows from there, apart from some vague recollection that I have of "natural law" from my studies of philosophy of law at university, a concept which I seem to remember appealed to me at the time.

But where I struggle is in the kind of situations that are characterised by the example that you have given, where a seemingly moral act (rescuing the man hanging from the cliff) would not necessarily benefit society and might be to the detriment of the individual. My theory, in its basic form, would demand that the bystander weigh up all kinds of variables, many of which will not be readily apparent. Is the person in danger beyond the age of procreation and therefore possibly of little further benefit to society? Is he perhaps a thief and a murderer? Or is he someone whose prolonged existence is likely to benefit society? What are the risks involved in saving him? Is it more likely than not that the prospective rescuer would succeed in accomplishing the rescue without loss of his own life, or is there an appreciable risk that both will die in the effort?

But the reality is that the bystander will not spend much time weighing up such considerations. More often than not, he will simply act on an instinctive basis. And, while it is by no means a given that the bystander will attempt the rescue (this depends perhaps where he falls on my sliding scale), I think (or like to think) that, more often than not, he will, regardless of the considerations outlined above.

So, why would he do so when his actions might not benefit, and might in fact be to the detriment, of society and himself? Well, I tried to explain this in terms of moral actions (because they benefit society) eliciting positive feelings within the individual (in the way that a contribution to charity might elicit a warm feeling). My hunch is that this positive internal reaction to moral behaviour has become so developed in us (or perhaps I should say some of us) that it is triggered even by actions that go beyond the original basis for moral behaviour (the benefit to society). Does this mean that highly altrusitic behaviour is selfish? Well, if you don't believe in a higher authority, then I think that it does, yes. But is that necessarily a bad thing when it results in behaviour that most of us would view as "the right way to act". And I should reiterate that I believe that most virtuous behaviour is actually to the benefit of society.

I guess that I am also trying to say that I feel that you did not really address the question that the phantom asked above.

Well, I'm sorry if that is the case. To sum it up in a nutshell (something that I'm evidently not very good at doing [img]smilies/rolleyes.gif[/img] ), moral behaviour is preferable to immoral behaviour because:

• it benefits society (and as society benefits, so do the majority of people who live within it - that's why we live in societies; and
• because it stands a better chance of bringing greater reward (materially, physically and spiritually) to the individual.

[Aiwendil]

Lyta Underhill wrote:

But I would also say that these same laws are human constructs derived to explain a universe that always manages to stay several steps ahead of the theorists, just as the tiny bugs of the universe seem to stay several steps ahead of the latest antimicrobial drugs.

This sounds a bit like constructivism (the view that science is just a societal/cultural phenomenon like any other, and that scientific theories are just human inventions). But I'm not sure whether you're really advocating a constructivist position or not. Certainly it may seem like the universe is always staying a step ahead of science, but surely it's not literally true that the universe is actually changing its fundamental laws as we discover them. There's a huge difference between saying that the fundamental laws of physics are complicated and saying that there are no fundamental laws of physics.

the explanation of newer physics concepts to the layman is beginning to sound more and more like a spiritual exercise than a mathematical one.

I know what you mean; but it's important to remember that this is only an appearance. The actual scientific theories in question are still purely mathematical. It's just that they are so complex and convoluted that in popular books, their results must be reduced to bald statements that are bound to sound mystical.

Most people believe they will be satisfied when a certain desire is met, which is a dangerous thing to assume, since desire appears addictive and ultimately never satisfiable.

All desires? What about the desire to be moral? Surely that's satisfiable. What about the desire to write a symphony? Surely that's satisfiable. What about the desire to quench one's thirst?

Your meaning, presumably, was that immoral desires are never satisifed. But I don't see any reason to think this is always true.

Lush wrote:

What I meant is that I find it hilarious when people look down upon others for doing stuff one might consider immoral (coke, cute little freshmen, whatever floats your boat) when they often experience the very same urges.

Ah. I misunderstood you.

And as for physics: I've got a few friends over at the Duke Physics Dept., and we'll get together some nights and talk, and they will say to me that there are moments when they have no idea what on earth it is that they are studying and ultimately it does seem as if physics and its purpose will never be fully explained either.

But the great complexity of physics should not be mistaken for some kind of foundational philosophical problem. I know I sometimes feel overwhelmed and bewildered by such things as quantum physics (or even by classical electromagnetism). And it is certainly true that quantum mechanics (and to a lesser degree, relativity) is radically counter-intuitive. But none of this undermines the mathematical foundations of physics.

As for not knowing the purpose of physics: this is surely a case of making a question more complicated than it really is. The purpose of physics is to predict the positions of particles at arbitrary times. And that purpose has not changed since the invention of mathematical physics.

Sorry for going on about this rahter tangential topic.

[ October 28, 2003: Message edited by: Aiwendil ]