Of Evil, Free will, and Fate (from 'Gollum')

[Aiwendil]

How can a tainted spirit become good again? More importantly, can a tainted spirit bring itself to repent and become good again?

I think the examples of Morgoth and Sauron demonstrate that repentance is possible - even though neither of them chose it, it was named as a real possibility. I would guess that the only criterion for one to become good again is that one wills it.

We know all beings have free will - they can choose good or evil. For a being to fall in completely to evil from day one can't be innate. How does evil get it's start?

I think the start of evil in Tolkien's world cannot be reduced beyond free will. Of course, we could say that pride and, apparently, the desire to create new things lead to evil; but the question then becomes: whence pride and desire? And again, we must say "free will". Free will is sort of like a quantum wave - it can basicly do anything, without any cause.

When someone does evil, and yet the end result is good, does that make the evil-doer good, or only the being who has authority over that evil-doer?

I think (and keep in mind that I'm talking strictly about Tolkien's universe now, not reality) that good and evil depend solely upon the will of the subject. This is a rather Augustinian view: that actions are not good evil; will is. I think that Augustine can be applied fairly well to Tolkien's mythology in general.

What flaws do you see in the characters (that are mentally) so affected by Ring that make them forget their goodness?

This and the other questions you ask about the Ring seem to point at the ambiguity in its nature identified by Tom Shippey in Author of the Century. That is, they point at the ambiguity between the Manichean view of evil and what he calls the Boethian view. The Manichean view is that evil is a thing; it is a force, the equal and opposite of good. The Boethian view, and the standard view of Christianity for over a thousand years, is that evil is not a thing. It is merely the absence of good. A Manichean interpretation of the Ring would be that it has some evil power in it that controls those who use it or desire it. The Boethian view would be that the Ring is a sort of "psychic amplifier" that draws out whatever evil tendencies or flaws exist in those who use it or desire it. There is textual evidence for both interpretations - on the one hand, it is said that a part of Sauron's power went into the Ring, and that the Ring seeks to return to its master. On the other hand, the most virtuous characters are less affected by it than others - as you point out. I think the answer is that the Ring is both, and this ambiguity is one of Tolkien's brilliant touches.

I think that the question of free will has represented a challenge to reasoning and insight on many levels over the ages - philosophical, religious, and scientific - and continues to do so. For example, the current notions of genetic determinism, from Dawkins' 'selfish gene' supposition, to oppositional theories of teleological evolution (Shepherd et al), is a hot area.

I think that the greater part of this inquiry into the question of free will is somewhat misguided. There are two questions that people tend to confound, one about free will and one not, and the aspect to which very much attention has been given is that which is not. Free will is not a psychological question; it is metaphysical. But the point of so much contention is not really free will; it is, rather, the question of which is more influential in determining a person's behavior: long-term, identifiable factors or short-term cognitive factors.

That was a digression, but I couldn't help myself. The question here is of course not about the real world. It is about Tolkien's universe and, perhaps, the Christian universe.

I think it is important first of all to refute as far as possible the notion of a clumsy determinism such as " 'Evil' A murdered 'Good' B, and 'Evil' C murdered 'Good' D, but then 'Evil' A murdered 'Evil' C before being brought to justice by 'Good' E, so A was in fact 'Good' in the end". Does anybody really think life is that simple?

Some people do. A somewhat simplistic utilitarian argument might be exactly that (provided that the good done by murdering C is greater than the evil done by murdering B). I would personally make the distinction between absolute good - the net change in the situation of the universe as a result of an action - and relative good - the degree to which an individual acts in accordance with morality. But within Arda, I think you are right; in fact, I think that no action can make a person good.

The concept that, in the presence of a (or the) Creator, free will operates within limited boundaries is not really a workable axiom ... it's a bit like saying "You can do what you want, as long as what you want is what I want".

I agree with you in general, but cautiously. The fact is that constraints do not necessarily contradict free will. For example (and let's assume for a moment that free will exists): I can will that I walk up a vertical wall, but I am constrained by the laws of physics, and I cannot. So it is certainly possible to imagine a creator establishing certain limitations on the free will he/she/it has created. However, if we assume a Judeo-Christian sort of God, it seems somewhat illogical for that God to create beings with free will and then confine them to a very narrow range of actions.

That is to say, how does any evil arise from utter goodness (at any level of subcreation).

I don't think that, in a Judeo-Christian-Tolkienian context, the origin of evil can be any further reduced than to free will. Free will is a strange and in some ways paradoxical concept, but one thing it does very well is act as a metaphysical device for the creation of evil. The paradox lies, I think, not in the generation of evil by free will, but in the generation of free will by supreme good. This is in my opinion an unanswerable question, and an unresolved contradiction. If you're going to suspend disbelief and accept Tolkien's world though (or, I would add, Judeo-Christian theology), you simply have to accept it.

But for that free will to occur, it must be willed (created) and tolerated.

Ah. I should really read the whole post I'm responding to before answering - this is exactly the point I just made.

You can indeed argue that an acceptable axiomatic principle cannot be created from two flawed axioms ... and you would inevitably end up in a reflection on a priori and a posteriori assertions, or descend into Kantian analytics and synthetics

Yet it is surely true that an axiomatic principle cannot be created from two flawed axioms. Just because you don't like where a thing leads doesn't mean that you can refuse to accept that thing.

Behind all this is the logical problem of causality itself. You cannot really logically have a first cause (or final cause) which are somehow exempt from empirically observable causality.

This is entirely true (it's actually so obvious that it's hard to see how Aquinas didn't notice it). Nevertheless, we are speaking about Middle-earth, wherein there is a supremely good, omipotent, omniscient first mover. Within this context, that is axiomatic.

It seems clear to me that Tolkien never resolved this level of philosophical problem, or indeed attempted to.

Agreed.

And perhaps we could consider that 'contradiction' as an inherent and inevitable state might be something with which we can accept or acknowledge our humanity.

I'm not sure I follow you here. The contradictions we have been considering arise out of the postulation of both a supremely good God and free will/evil. They are perhaps inevitable within religions, but I don't think they are inevitable universally.

The only way to be redeemed after having been found *guilty* is to be "pardoned" by the giver of the law, or by his appointed surrogates.

This is a very good point.

The transgression is still a transgression of the law laid down, but it cannot impede or hinder the inexorable march of the will of the Creator.

I think this is a fundamentally different thing from redemption. What you are talking about here is that the existence of evil is tributary to good. That alone does not redeem the one who committed the evil, however. Morgoth is never redeemed, yet the evil that he caused is ultimately tributary to the good of Eru.

[ November 27, 2002: Message edited by: Aiwendil ]